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ARTICLE
THE MYTH AND REALITY OF “SHARI’A
COURTS” IN CANADA: A DELAYED
OPPORTUNITY FOR THE
INDIGENIZATION OF ISLAMIC
LEGAL RULINGS
FAISAL KUTTY*
INTRODUCTION
From 2003 to 2005, the Province of Ontario, Canada, was the setting
for an internationally reported controversy about using Islamic legal princi-
ples in resolving disputes under the province’s Arbitration Act of 1991.1
The debate did not die on September 11, 2005, when Premier Dalton
McGuinty announced his decision to ostensibly2 ban the use of religious
laws in resolving family disputes.3 The passage of the Family Statute Law
Amendment Act, 2005,4 formalizing Premier McGuinty’s decision, served
* Faisal Kutty, J.D. (Ottawa) and LL.M. (Osgoode), is a Visiting Assistant Professor of
Law at Valparaiso University School of Law and an Adjunct Professor of Law at Osgoode Hall
Law School of York University. He is a co-founder of the Toronto-based firm KSM Law and
served as counsel to a coalition of national Muslim organizations during the faith-based arbitration
controversy in Ontario. The discussions in Part 5 of this article first appeared in an earlier research
project, published as Faisal Kutty, The Shari’a Factor in International Commercial Arbitration,
28 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 565, 577–89 (2006). The author would like to acknowledge
research assistance from Sarah Mohamed, Honours B.A. (History) from York University, and J.D.
Candidate (2011), Osgoode, and Aimee Gong, B.A. (Sociology) from Purdue University, and J.D.
Candidate (2012), Valparaiso University School of Law. He would also like to thank Akbar
Mohamed for his comments and Shaikh Ahamed Kutty for his comments, suggestions, and en-
couragement. The author remains indebted to them for their help, suggestions, and insights with-
out which this project would have been left incomplete.
1. Arbitration Act S.O. 1991, c.17 (Can.).
2. I concur with many observers that this announcement was more of a political exercise in
“smoke and mirrors” and does not in fact prevent people from resolving disputes using religious
principles. It merely contributed to the negative perception of Islam and Muslims and in this
fashion serves as a hindrance to the acceptance of Islam and Muslims on an equal footing in
Canadian society.
3. Colin Freeze & Karen Howlett, McGuinty Government Rules Out Use of Sharia Law,
GLOBE & MAIL, Sept. 12, 2005.
4. Family Statute Law Amendment Act, S.O. 2006, c.1 (Can.).
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only to fuel debates that have been raging in liberal democracies for some
time.
Those opposed to arbitrating family disputes using religious principles
under the Arbitration Act raised legitimate concerns about gender equality
and minority rights within religious communities.5 They questioned the role
of religion in secular society and opposed what they saw as privatization of
the legal system.6 Proponents, however, contended that religious groups
should be able to govern their lives according to their conscience within the
parameters of law if the constitutional rights to freedom of religion and
association are to have any real value. They further contended that the sys-
tem was consistent with Canadian tradition of multicultural citizenship. Fi-
nally, proponents argued consenting and informed adults must be able to
make religious choices, even if others do not see these as “correct” choices.
The issues, of course, transcend dispute resolution and tug at funda-
mental tensions surrounding multiculturalism and national identity: the sep-
aration of church and state, and the limits of accommodation and legal
pluralism within a liberal democracy. The controversy offers up much for
debate.
In this paper, I limit myself to arguing that the government of Ontario
delayed an opportunity to contribute to the evolution of Islamic law by in-
digenizing Islamic legal rulings. Such a process would enable integration of
its Muslim citizens into broader Canadian society by allowing them to
maintain their identity and develop their practices in an “organic” manner.7
In Part 1, I provide a brief background on the controversy. Part 2 summa-
rizes former Attorney General Marion Boyd’s report on the issue commis-
5. See, e.g., Ayelet Shachar, Religion, State, and the Problem of Gender: New Modes of
Citizenship and Governance in Diverse Societies, 50 MCGILL L.J. 49 (2005); see also MARION
BOYD, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN FAMILY LAW: PROTECTING CHOICE, PROMOTING INCLUSION
(2004), http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/boyd/fullreport.pdf.
6. See Natasha Bakht, Family Arbitration Using Sharia Law: Examining Ontario’s Arbitra-
tion Act and its Impact on Women, 1 MUSLIM WORLD J. HUM. RTS. 1 (2004) [hereinafter Bakht,
Family Arbitration]; Natasha Bakht, Arbitration, Religion and Family Law: Private Justice on the
Backs of Women, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF WOMEN AND THE LAW (2005), http://www.nawl.ca/
ns/en/documents/Pub_Rprt_ReligArb05_en.pdf [hereinafter Bakht, Private Justice].
7. There is often confusion between the term Shari’a and Islamic law or Islamic jurispru-
dence. I will be using Islamic law to refer to Islamic legal rules and will relate it to the broader
concept of Shari’a. The two terms were used interchangeably and inaccurately in much of the
discussion and debate around this issue. Muhammad Asad, a prominent Islamic thinker, narrows
down the Shari’a to the nusus, the definitive ordinances of the Qur’an, which are expounded in
positive legal terms. Muhammad Hashim Kamali, Source, Nature and Objectives of Shari’ah, 33
ISLAMIC Q. 215, 217 (1989). The Shari’a is therefore broader as explained later in the paper.
While Islamic law in the narrow sense is limited to the laws, it is more comprehensive in terms of
including even those rules and laws that have been derived using the sources and methodologies
for deriving laws sanctioned by Islamic jurisprudence as well as all the quasi-Islamic laws in
existence in Muslim countries as a result of colonization and secularization. See Irshad Abdal-
Haqq, Islamic Law: An Overview of Its Origins and Elements, 7 J. ISLAMIC L. & CULTURE 27,
31–33 (2002). This paper limits the discussion of Islamic law to the private realm of personal
relations and contractual matters in the area of family law.
2010] MYTH AND REALITY OF “SHARI’A COURTS” IN CANADA 561
sioned by the Ontario government. In Part 3, I provide an overview of the
Muslim communities’8 response to the proposal put forth by the Islamic
Institute of Civil Justice (IICJ) and document my role as counsel to various
community groups in this matter. In Part 4, I situate the debate within the
context of the existing legal framework for family law in the province. In
Part 5, I provide a basic primer on Islam and its legal system.
I then explore the indigenization potential provided by this opportunity
in Part 6. More specifically, I argue that this controversy provided an op-
portunity for the ummah (Muslim community)9 to internally struggle with
its customs, practices, and principles.10 This community-led, bottom-up
model of Islamic reform, which Mashood Baderin has accurately labeled
“the socio-cultural and harmonistic approach,” is the most sustainable,
peaceful, and legitimate route to develop new rulings and laws.11
The various schools and groupings within the ummah must be en-
couraged to grapple with the existing traditions of Islam and to work with
its tool box of legal and political theory to start devising a more Canadian
version of Islam and Islamic law.12 The least we can do is to allow the
communities as a whole to negotiate and work out their own norms, rather
than attempt to impose values and judgments.13
I suggest that this organic bottom-up consensus-building approach to
Islamic reform would be in line with the long established Islamic traditions
of tajdid (renewal) and islah (reform).14 As Tariq Ramadan argues, this re-
form must take a radical trajectory and consider the modern/Western con-
text and human wisdom accumulated since the classical Islamic era.15 The
product of this process would not only have more relevance in the lives of
8. There is no such thing as a homogenous or monolithic Muslim community. There are
multiple communities with different ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and social practices and varying
degrees of orthodoxy that make up the “Muslim community.”
9. The ummah in this context would be the local Canadian or more specifically the Ontario
ummah. This specification will be consistent with the Islamic tradition of geographically and
contextually specific schools of jurisprudence. See Basheer M. Nafi, The Rise of Islamic Reformist
Thought and its Challenge to Traditional Islam, in ISLAMIC THOUGHT IN THE TWENTIETH CEN-
TURY 2–60 (Suha Taji-Farouki & Basheer M. Nafi eds., 2004), for a discussion of the differences
arising from geography and other external influences.
10. By way of conclusion, I also argue that rather than ameliorating the potential issues
within the community, the Premier’s decision actually did nothing to address them and perpetu-
ates the existence of unregulated and unsupervised mediations and arbitrations using religious
principles.
11. See Mashood A. Baderin, Islam and the Realization of Human Rights in the Muslim
World: A Reflection on Two Essential Approaches and Two Divergent Perspectives, 4 MUSLIM
WORLD J. HUM. RTS. 1, 1–25 (2007) (although addressing a different context).
12. See, e.g., Anver M. Emon, Islamic Law and the Canadian Mosaic: Politics, Jurispru-
dence, and Multicultural Accommodation, 87 LA REVUE DU BARREAU CANADIEN 391 (2008).
13. Clearly we as a society would step in only when and if vulnerable segments of the group
are exploited or abused. This decision must be evidence based and not speculative.
14. John O. Voll, Renewal and Reform in Islamic History: Tajdid and Islah, in VOICES OF
RESURGENT ISLAM 32–47 (John L. Esposito ed., 1983).
15. TARIQ RAMADAN, RADICAL REFORM: ISLAMIC ETHICS AND LIBERATION 12–13 (2009).
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contemporary Muslims, but it will also have greater legitimacy for its inher-
ent consistency with Islamic doctrines and concepts. Indeed, this grounding
in the universal and timeless values of Islam may better inoculate these
reforms from the inevitable attacks from extremists and even some tradi-
tionalists, who will undoubtedly label them as Western impositions. Such a
community-led process is also necessary to ensure that integration is a two-
way process of accommodation between majority and minority communi-
ties. In Part 7, before concluding the paper, I situate the debate and potential
for “indigenization” within the broader context of multicultural citizenship
and legal pluralism.
PART 1 – BACKGROUND OF THE CONTROVERSY
The controversy erupted in the fall of 2003, when a small Muslim
group led by a retired lawyer, Syed Mumtaz Ali,16 announced the formation
of the IICJ to provide a framework to resolve private disputes using Islamic
legal principles.17 The IICJ announcement left the false impression that the
Ontario government had granted the IICJ some form of special dispensation
or permission to establish a “Shari’a Court.”18 Moreover, the IICJ’s care-
less pronouncements also suggested that participation may not have been
voluntary.19
In reality, this was neither the establishment of a parallel religious
court system in Ontario nor the lead chariot in the procession of political
Islam. In fact, as the Attorney General’s Office reiterated at the time, no
changes had been made to the province’s arbitration regime since its enact-
ment. The existing Arbitration Act allowed parties to resolve their private
disputes—commercial, ecclesiastical, or familial—through voluntary arbi-
tration using any “rules of law.”20
Ontario has had a statute governing arbitrations dating back to the
nineteenth century.21 The current Arbitration Act, 1991, which was at the
center of the controversy, came into existence in 1992.22 This act came
about when the province adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act, developed in
16. Syed Mumtaz Ali was one of the first Muslim lawyers in Canada and the first to be
sworn in on the Qur’an instead of the Bible. Noor Javed, Syed Mumtaz Ali, 82: Lawyer Led Fight
for Religious Arbitration, TORONTO STAR, Jul. 21, 2009, http://www.thestar.com/article/669288.
He passed away on July 16, 2009. Id.
17. Judy Van Rhijn, First Steps Taken for Islamic Arbitration Board, L. TIMES, Nov. 24,
2003, at 11.
18. Id.; see also BOYD, supra note 5, at 3.
19. BOYD, supra note 5, at 3.
20. Arbitration Act, S.O. 1991, c. 17, s. 32(1) (Can.).
21. BOYD, supra note 5, at 11.
22. Ontario was the first of seven provinces (Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario,
New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, and Nova Scotia) that have now adopted the Uniform
Arbitration Act, which was drafted in 1990 by the Uniform Law Conference of Canada. See id., at
10–11; Law Reform Commission of Canada, Uniform Arbitration Act (1990), available at http://
ulcc.ca/en/us/arbitrat.pdf.
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1990 by the Uniform Law Conference of Canada. The Act allows parties to
have their dispute settled by an agreed upon adjudicator. The process is
based on contract law and parties are given a significant amount of freedom
in its design.23 Parties have full rights to choose what rules will govern the
resolution of the dispute—be it religious, secular, Ontario law, the law of
other jurisdictions, or any other mutually agreed upon rules.24 While a party
cannot unilaterally withdraw from the process after agreeing to arbitration,
the process can be altered or terminated if both parties consent. As with any
contractual arrangement, courts can stay any pending action while the mat-
ter is being arbitrated.25 Courts will also issue arbitral awards, enforcing the
decisions that result from the process.
As with almost all dispute resolution methods, arbitration must be
jointly and voluntarily chosen by the parties to the dispute.26 The only
mandatory dispute resolution option is the court system; a party filing a
claim or bringing an action or application through the courts can compel the
other party to respond. Even in cases that proceed through the courts, the
initiating party must take the first step by filing a claim or bringing the
matter to a court. Generally, an affected party is under no obligation to
enforce its rights, whether it be through the courts or otherwise.
It is important to note for our purposes that neither the Arbitration Act
of 1991 nor its precursors implicitly or explicitly excluded family and in-
heritance disputes. Moreover, given that the IICJ was simply using existing
Ontario legislation, the government had no positive role or duty in the pro-
cess. Indeed, in line with the growing interest in Alternative Dispute Reso-
lution (ADR), various other cultural and religious groups took advantage of
the Act for years to offer an alternative to the antagonistic legal system
without any uproar or controversy.27
23. Arbitration Act, S.O. 1991, c. 17, s. 2 (Can.). The Act refers to the process as an arbitra-
tion agreement.
24. Id. at s. 32(1).
25. Id. at s. 7.
26. One argument is that women will be forced to submit to arbitration and this will be
discussed in detail later in this paper.
27. Other communities have successfully implemented Alternative Dispute Resolution
(ADR) initiatives. For instance, rabbinical courts (Beth Din) dealing with business and matrimo-
nial issues of Jewish parties have been functioning for some time in Ontario. See Bakht, Family
Arbitration, supra note 6, at 1; BOYD, supra note 5, at 55–59.
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PART 2 – THE MARION BOYD REPORT
In response to the mounting pressure from women’s groups28 and two
secular Muslim groups,29 the government formally asked former attorney
general and women’s rights advocate, Marion Boyd, to study the issue of
whether religious laws should continue to be allowed in family law arbitra-
tions. Boyd was categorical in her report (the “Boyd Report”): “The Arbi-
tration Act should continue to allow disputes to be arbitrated using religious
laws . . . .”30 Her 191-page report attempted to address some of the legiti-
mate concerns of those opposed to the proposal while trying to preserve the
arbitration regime’s integrity. Toward this end, Boyd concluded with forty-
six well thought out recommendations, including:31
• Amendments to the Family Law Act and the Arbitration Act to
ensure that the mediation and arbitration agreements are legally
treated in the same manner as marriage contracts and separation
agreements;32
• Calling for regulations to ensure proper record keeping, man-
dating written decisions, and training of arbitrators;33
28. These include the National Organization of Immigrant and Visible Minority Women of
Canada, the National Association of Women and the Law (NAWL), the YWCA Canada, and the
Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF). See, e.g., Andre´ Coˆte´, An Open Letter Op-
posing the Use of Arbitration & Faith-Based Tribunals in Family Law in Ontario, 23 Jurisfemme,
Spring 2005, at 1, available at http://www.nawl.ca/en/newlibrarypage/jurisfemme/64-jfvolume23
2005 (calling on the government to reject Boyd’s recommendations).
29. Not all secular Muslim groups were opposed. The Canadian Council of Muslim Women
(CCMW) and the Muslim Canadian Congress were the most vocal and media savvy and they were
the main Muslim groups opposing the initiative fully. The CCMW organized a coalition of 100
organizations including those set out in footnote 28 to oppose religious arbitration. See Natasha
Bakht, Were Muslim Barbarians Really Knocking on the Gates of Ontario?: The Religious Arbi-
tration Controversy—Another Perspective, in 40TH ANNIV. ED. OTTAWA L. REV. 67, 67–82
(2006), available at http://www.lawsite.ca/OLR_Barbarians-Arb_Article.pdf [hereinafter Bakht,
Muslim Barbarians]. Interestingly, Bakht wrote reports for the coalition against faith-based arbi-
tration and later reconsidered her position in this reconsidered paper. The CCMW’s opposition
was partly based on legitimate concerns and partly based on misunderstanding of the existing
family law regime and scope of arbitration, as discussed in this paper. The Muslim Canadian
Congress has a track record of being fiercely secular and has had a knee jerk objection to anything
“Islamic.” See, e.g., MUSLIM CANADIAN CONGRESS, SO-CALLED SHARIA MORTGAGES ARE A DE-
CEPTION (2008), http://www.muslimcanadiancongress.org/20080129.html (Islamic finance); MUS-
LIM CANADIAN CONGRESS, TOP EGYPTIAN CLERIC SAYS NIQAB HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH ISLAM
(2009), http://www.muslimcanadiancongress.org/20091008.html (the veil or niqab); Tarek Fatah
& Salma Siddiqui, Tory Attempts to Secure Religious Minority Vote, TORONTO STAR, June 15,
2007, available at http://www.thestar.com/comment/article/225577 (funding of Islamic schools);
MUSLIM CANADIAN CONGRESS, MUSLIM CANADIAN CONGRESS CONDEMNS ISLAMIC EXTREMISM
(2006), http://www.muslimcanadiancongress.org/20060619.html (cash fundraising within the
community). The vast majority of Muslim groups, both secular and traditional, were either silent
or endorsed the idea of choice to varying degrees.
30. BOYD, supra note 5, at 3.
31. Boyd met with more than 200 people and reviewed over forty submissions. See id. at
145–56.
32. See id. at 133–34.
33. Id. at 134–37, 139–40.
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• Imposing a duty on arbitrators to ensure that parties understand
their rights and are participating voluntarily;34
• Providing for greater oversight and accountability, including
empowering courts to set aside arbitral awards for various rea-
sons including unconscionability, inadequate financial disclo-
sure, or if a party did not understand the nature or consequences
of the arbitration agreement;35
• Public education and community development;36
• Expanded appeal possibilities;37 and
• Further policy analysis to determine whether additional safe-
guards are required.38
Many critics opposed the report, both from within and outside of the
Muslim community.39 A central critique was that there is no way to ascer-
tain true consent, as Muslim women would be forced to submit to social
pressure and accept unfair decisions.40 This concern is valid, but what ap-
peared lost in the debate was that such fears are not restricted to Muslims or
arbitrations, per se. In fact, women and men, irrespective of their religion,
face pressures in all facets of human interaction. These pressures exist even
in the non-alternative legal setting, where the vast majority of cases are
settled out of court and where, in many instances, parties compromise for
less than their legal entitlements. Social pressure may be even more acute in
many cases that are settled without the benefit of any legal advice or over-
sight. Indeed, many resolve their issues, including family matters, through
paralegals, who in many cases act for both parties without any thought as to
whether the parties appreciate what rights they are giving up. Moreover,
many settle such matters themselves or simply walk away from disputes.
None of the critics’ concerns were unsolvable nor were they restricted ex-
clusively to the arbitration context.41
From my perspective, Boyd’s report merely affirmed the constitutional
right to religious freedom, equal treatment under the law, multiculturalism,
and ensured that the state was in compliance with its international obliga-
34. See id. at 135–36.
35. See id. at 134, 140–41.
36. Id. at 138, 141.
37. See id. at 134–36.
38. Id. at 141–42.
39. The critics came from all camps and perspectives.
40. Another criticism that was leveled at Boyd’s position was that a party will be able to
waive independent legal advice (ILA) if they wish. Again this ignores the fact that as it stands
now, nobody can be forced to obtain ILA for any legal matter—though this may be moot as this
leaves it open for courts to set aside any agreements or arbitral decisions. Forcing ILA would be
great for the legal profession but would seriously restrict the ability of people to bargain freely or
settle issues without a lawyer and would clearly represent unnecessary intrusion by governments
into the private domain, particularly given that an exploited or abused party has the theoretical
option to have the matter set aside for lack of ILA. See BOYD, supra note 5.
41. In fact, some could have also been partly addressed by imposing duties on arbitrators and
implementing some of Boyd’s recommendations.
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tions.42 Indeed, Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights imposes a positive duty on states to assist minorities in
preserving their values by allowing them to enjoy their own culture and to
profess and practice their own religion.43 In my view, Boyd balanced the
rights of those who wished to voluntarily resolve their private disputes us-
ing religious principles with the basic rights of vulnerable segments within
these same religious communities.44 Of course, this does not mean that fam-
ily law arbitrations are without problems or issues. In fact, one of the posi-
tive results of the discussions was the acknowledgment that there were
issues in the family law context—be it in arbitration or otherwise.45 The
issues of social pressure, lack of access to justice, imbalance in bargaining
positions and power, and various other potential problems exist. For our
purposes, it is important to recognize that they exist in the ADR as well as
the non-ADR legal contexts.
PART 3 – MUSLIM COMMUNITIES’ REACTION AND RESPONSE46
Among the province’s growing, diverse Muslim population, reactions
to the proposed Islamic arbitration regime ranged from apathy, to fear that
tribunal decisions may be biased against women, to wholehearted endorse-
ment. Some thought of it as a panacea that would solve their alleged inabil-
ity to live as “good” Muslims, while others saw wholesale government-
sanctioned discrimination against Muslim women. The vast majority of On-
tario Muslims, however, did not see arbitration as a critical issue for the
community and only gave it passing interest.
A combination of misunderstanding, ignorance, and careless pro-
nouncements from those on all sides of the issue, as well as inaccurate and
biased media coverage, helped fuel a firestorm.47 Many in the mainstream
uncritically accepted the misunderstanding first promoted, most likely inad-
vertently, by the IICJ and later by the media that the government had ap-
proved new “Shari’a Courts” with coercive powers to force all Muslims to
arbitrate using Islamic laws. Opponents from both within and outside the
Muslim community, some who saw the initiative as “Muslim barbarians
42. Technically, under the Canadian Constitution, this is the responsibility of the federal
government, not the province of Ontario.
43. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, accession by Canada May 19, 1976).
44. There are numerous criticisms of the Boyd report from the religious perspective as well,
but given the existing climate this was the best compromise; a compromise that could certainly
have been improved upon from both positions.
45. Much more focus and effort should have been directed toward these issues. See, e.g.,
Trevor C.W. Farrow, Re-Framing the Sharia Arbitration Debate, 15 CONST. F. 79 (2006).
46. See supra note 8.
47. See CATHERINE MORRIS, MEDIA’S MEDIATION AND OTHER MATTERS: FAITH-BASED DIS-
PUTE RESOLUTION IN CANADA (2006), http://www.cba.org/CBA/newsletters/pdf/ADR-Morris_
presentation.pdf; James Thornback, The Portrayal of Sharia in Ontario, 10 APPEAL 1 (2005).
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knocking on the gates of Ontario,”48 mobilized their resources and reacted
swiftly on a global level. They launched a “no-Shari’a” campaign, which
confirmed the Islamophobia fears of some.49 These fears were exacerbated
by well-intentioned but misguided feminists who were coming to the aid of
“Imperiled Muslim Women.”50
I can appreciate that many were concerned about the exploitation of
Muslim women. At times, however, public discourse fueled “moral
panic”51 and crossed into Islamophobia. For instance, in November 2004 I
sat on a panel at the University of Toronto where some lawyers suggested
that Muslim lawyers should not be able to participate in such arbitrations or
to provide independent legal advice to Muslim women because Muslim
lawyers may be biased and may participate in the abuse of women.52
In another instance, a non-Muslim lawyer who was a partner at a
prominent Bay Street law firm was singled out by his firm because he had
made representations in favor of allowing faith-based arbitration and be-
cause he had encouraged a female Muslim law student intern to write in
support of the initiative in a major daily newspaper. The firm was con-
cerned about the public relations harm of being associated with the “wrong”
side of this controversial issue. The firm’s response was one of the factors
that motivated the lawyer to ultimately leave the firm.53
As the debate intensified, I was engaged by five of the largest national
Muslim groups to advocate for the choice to engage in arbitration using
Islamic legal principles, with some additional checks to ensure that the vul-
nerable were not coerced, exploited, or abused in the process. While virtu-
ally all national Muslim groups expressed similar concerns, those in favor
of choice were painted by the same brush. In fact, those who spoke in favor
of faith-based arbitration, however nuanced or conditional, were often seen
48. Natasha Bakht, Religious Arbitration in Canada: Protecting Women by Protecting Them
from Religion, 19 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 119, 123 (2007) [hereinafter Bakht, Religious
Arbitration].
49. Many in the community saw some of the opponents as singling out Muslims and Islam.
Interestingly, one of the main opponents, Homa Arjomand, has given some credence to this by
now focusing her energy on opposing Islamic education of children. See HOMA ARJOMAND, IN-
TERNATIONAL DECLARATION, ISLAMIC SCHOOLS SHOULD BE BANNED, CHILDREN HAVE NO RELIG-
ION, http://new.petitiononline.com/nofaith/petition.html.
50. See Sherene H. Razack, The ‘Sharia Law Debate’ in Ontario: The Modernity/Premoder-
nity Distinction in Legal Efforts to Protect Women from Culture, 15 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 3,
10–12 (2007); see also Bakht, Muslim Barbarians, supra note 29.
51. Stanley Cohen first introduced the term when a “condition, episode, person or group of
persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests [and] its nature is
presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion.” STANLEY COHEN, FOLK DEVILS AND MORAL
PANICS 1 (2002).
52. University of Toronto Student Affairs Office and the Faculty of Law Diversity Commit-
tee Symposium, Keeping the Faith: Alternative Dispute Resolution in Ontario’s Faith Communi-
ties (Nov. 18, 2004); see also supra note 45.
53. Although engaged actively on this issue he has never really publicized this story. He
spoke about it at one event that addressed the controversy.
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as contributing to the exploitation and abuse of women.54 Indeed, many in
the Muslim community did not appreciate the widespread belief evident
during the debate that Muslim women would necessarily be abused and
exploited if the choice were available. As Mihad Fahmy, a Muslim woman
lawyer who advocated in favor of faith-based arbitration wrote:
You may also have bought into the argument that Canadian-Mus-
lim women will somehow be coerced into the proposed faith-
based arbitration process. This, even though the same concern is
not expressed with respect to Jewish and Christian women, some
of whom already choose to settle family law and inheritance dis-
putes according to the laws of their respective faiths. It is frustrat-
ing that such biases and stereotypes about Islam, and Muslim
women in particular, have been driving the debate regarding re-
ligious-based arbitration.55
The hysteria reached a fevered pitch when Quebec Member of the Na-
tional Assembly Fatima Houda-Peppin—a self-proclaimed secular Mus-
lim—initiated and tabled a motion to ban Islamic tribunals.56 The minor
detail that makes this motion Islamophobic is that the province of Quebec’s
Civil Code specifically precludes the use of arbitration in the context of
family law disputes.57 As if to ensure that this was not lost on Muslims, the
Quebec International Relations Minister, Monique Gagnon-Tremblay, rein-
forced the hate and fear by stating, “Muslims who want to come to Quebec
and who do not respect women’s rights, or rights, whatever they may be, in
our civil code . . . [should] stay in their country and not come to Quebec,
because it’s unacceptable . . . .”58
These Islamophobic announcements and reactions contributed to the
involvement of many Muslims who were initially complacent or apathetic.
In fact, national Muslim organizations such as the Islamic Society of North
America (ISNA), the Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA), the Muslim
Association of Canada (MAC), the Canadian Muslim Civil Liberties Asso-
ciation (CMCLA), and the Canadian Council on American Islamic Rela-
tions (CAIR-CAN) actively participated in the issue only after the discourse
shifted to attacking Islam and singling out Muslims. CAIR-CAN was given
a lead role in this initiative by the collective and I acted as lead counsel. In
this capacity, I met with various parties and spoke on numerous panels,
54. See, e.g., Bakht, Muslim Barbarians, supra note 29, at 3.
55. Mihad Fahmy, Shariah Law Requires Tough, Open Debate, LONDON FREE PRESS, Sept.
14, 2004, http://www.caircan.ca/oped_more.php?id=1161_0_10_0_C.
56. Rheal Seguin, Quebec Squashes Idea of Islamic Tribunals, GLOBE & MAIL, May 27,
2005, at A1.
57. Civil Code of Que´bec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, art. 2639 (Can.) (“Disputes over the status and
capacity of persons, family matters or other matters of public order may not be submitted to
arbitration.”).
58. Mike De Souza, Quebec Leaders Warn Ontario: Reject Sharia: Minister Wants Immi-
grants Who Support It Barred, NAT’L POST, Mar. 11, 2005, at A8.
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including one in April 2005 organized by a leading opponent of the initia-
tive, the Canadian Council of Muslim Women (CCMW).59 Some of the
organizers were upset with me because I urged the attendees to read their
own report, prepared by University of Ottawa law professor Natasha Bakht,
and the Boyd Report so they could make an informed decision on this issue.
Bakht’s report set out the existing family law regime and the protections
and appeal/judicial review options available in the traditional and ADR
routes.60 Boyd’s in-depth investigation led Bakht to conclude that dispute
arbitration in accordance with religious laws should continue, though the
arbitration law needed to build in more safeguards to address some of the
issues with arbitration in general. The emotions were high; at one point I
was booed and heckled on stage during my presentation in front of 300 to
400 attendees.61
As the debate raged, a more formal meeting attended by representa-
tives of each of the groups I acted for, a number of local mosques, and
another national coalition group, the Coalition of Muslim Organizations
(COMO), took place at the sixth annual MAC-ICNA joint convention held
in Mississauga in September 2005.62 These groups were particularly con-
cerned about the paternalism and Islamophobia inherent in much of the dis-
cussion. I was invited to brief this larger group and a collective decision
was made to become more active in the debate. One of the major sugges-
tions was to have Muslim women take the lead. Unfortunately, it was too
late in the game to make any real inroads.63
In the months leading up to the September 11, 2005 decision to dis-
mantle all religiously-based family law arbitration, it appeared as though
the government had no choice but to continue to allow religious arbitrations
with the additional checks proposed by the Boyd Report. The coalition of
the five Muslim organizations I worked for argued that faith-based arbitra-
tions should continue as a protected and viable option, provided that they
were voluntary, that all of Boyd’s recommendations be adopted, and that
the courts would only enforce decisions consistent with Canadian laws. In
essence, arbitrations using religious principles should not be rejected out-
59. Faisal Kutty, Panel Discussion at the Canadian Council of Muslim Women Symposium:
Is There Room for Women’s Equality Rights in Religious Arbitration (Apr. 9, 2005), http://www.
ccmw.com/documents/CCMWSymposiumReport2005.pdf.
60. I concurred with most of her legal analysis but disagreed with her conclusion that out-
right prohibition of faith-based arbitration was the only solution.
61. Revealing the lack of knowledge about the issues involved, during question and answer
one lawyer even asked me what was wrong with Ontario law. My answer was, of course, nothing.
The initiative was simply attempting to use existing Ontario law. Interestingly, a number of wo-
men also came up after my presentation and said that they had totally misunderstood the issue and
although they were CCMW members they did not agree with the position of the CCMW.
62. See 6TH ANNUAL ICNA-MAC CONFERENCE (Sept. 17–18, 2005), http://melayu
canada.multiply.com/journal/item/32. Marion Boyd spoke about her report at this conference.
63. A press conference was organized to express some of the concerns. See Marina Jimenez,
Debate Stirs Hatred, Sharia Activists Say, GLOBE & MAIL, Sept. 15, 2005, at A6.
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right, but should be evaluated in light of Ontario laws and common law
principles.
Late in the summer of 2005, I received a call64 from the Attorney Gen-
eral’s Office during which the counsel canvassed with me whether, in my
opinion, my clients and the segment of the community they represented
would be satisfied if the government simply decided that arbitral awards
and decisions would be treated in the same manner as domestic contracts
(e.g., separation agreements, marriage contracts, etc.).65 My unequivocal re-
sponse was, yes, such a proposal would be acceptable as Muslims are asked
to respect the laws of the land where they live provided there is no positive
requirement to breach a religious obligation. This exchange left me under
the erroneous impression that the premier was simply going to adopt the
Boyd Report’s recommendations and treat such decisions in the same man-
ner as domestic contracts.66 I even informed some of my clients of this
imminent possibility.
This phone call took place just weeks before opponents descended on
Queen’s Park,67 accompanied by a number of nationally prominent wo-
men’s activists including June Callwood and Sally Armstrong, and urged
the premier to ban faith-based arbitration,68 which he did within the next
few days. The government essentially caved in to public pressure.
Democracy, of course, does pose the threat of unbridled majoritarian-
ism. In my experience, mass fears, hysteria, prejudices, and the ensuing
“moral panic” contributed to the government’s response as they tried to
appease the majority. It is at such times that one would expect to rely on
Constitutionalism, human rights, the principles of liberal democracy, and
opposition parties to stand up in defense of minority rights or the rights of
the unpopular. So it was surprising when both the New Democratic Party
(NDP) and the Conservative Party (Tories) did not speak out in support of
64. Telephone Call with Counsel from the Attorney General’s Office (Summer 2005).
65. Id. Not surprisingly, the Canadian Jewish Congress (CJC) also argued that arbitral deci-
sions should be treated in the same fashion as domestic contracts and that faith communities
should be involved in the development of the legislation’s regulations. See Faisal Kutty, Faith-
based Arbitrations in Ontario: A Lost Opportunity, LAW. WKLY., Mar. 24, 2006, http://faisalkutty.
com/publications/the-lawyers-weekly/comment-faith-based-arbitrations-in-ontario-a-lost-opportu-
nity/. Both suggestions were rejected outright without any reasons. As CJC counsel Mark Freiman
pointed out, the legislation and the process used to develop it appear to be based on the premise
that women are intrinsically incapable of voluntarily choosing faith-based arbitration. “It assumes
that faith-based approaches to arbitration are innately exploitative,” Freeman noted. “This view is
insulting to all women, and to the faiths to which Ontarians adhere.” Ontario Passes Law to
Prohibit Religious Tribunals for Family Law Cases, CANADIAN PRESS, Feb. 15, 2006, http://wwrn.
org/articles/20452/.
66. See discussion infra Part 4.
67. CTV.ca News Staff, Protesters March Against Sharia Law in Canada, Sept. 9, 2005,
http://www.ctv.ca/CTVNews/TopStories/20050909/sharia_law_ontario_050908/.
68. Marina Jimenez, Ontario Sharia Plan Protested, GLOBE & MAIL, Sept. 9, 2005, at A5.
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minority rights. In my meetings with Howard Hampton of the NDP69 and
John Tory of the Tories70 on behalf of my clients, it became clear that both
were reacting to widespread international opposition. In fact, they both indi-
cated that they never received so much opposition from an international
audience on any issue they had to grapple with in the context of governing
Ontario. It became evident that explaining the progressive possibilities of
Islamic law and the nuances of family law and the Arbitration Act would be
drowned out by the anti-religion activists and well-intentioned, but mis-
informed (or under-informed) women’s rights groups ostensibly trying to
protect Muslim women from religion.71 Both opposition parties in Ontario
thus enabled the majority to take away a right available to Ontarians since
1992 without any concrete evidence of harm.72 These members of provin-
cial parliament (MPPs) acted on speculation and against the recommenda-
tions of the government’s own report, perhaps a first in Ontario legislative
history.
Since the pronouncement, “back-alley” arbitrations continue through-
out the province, unregulated and unsupervised.73 For instance, clients have
approached me to complain about the Muslim Court of Arbitration (Darul
Qada) because the institution has purportedly granted divorces and issued
decisions without any authority.74 It should be pointed out that divorce can-
not be arbitrated. Nevertheless, in at least one such case brought to my
attention, the person was Islamically divorced (against his will) from his
wife after a brief conversation and some e-mail exchanges with the Darul
Qada. The person never consented nor submitted the matter to the tribunal.
The wife assumed she was divorced, while the husband struggled with the
legal system. Such decisions not only impact the issue of religious divorces
that fall outside the scope of the existing legal regime, but a religious deci-
69. This meeting was also attended by the executive director of the Canadian Muslim Civil
Liberties Association (CMCLA), Anwaar Syed, and the Toronto head of the Canadian Council on
American Islamic Relations (CAIR-CAN), Maryam Dadabhoy.
70. The meeting was also attended by the chairman of the Islamic Council of Imams Canada,
Imam Abdul Hai Patel, and Asma Warsi, a prominent woman activist in the community and
editor-in-chief of THE AMBITION, a community newspaper.
71. I acknowledge there were some legitimate concerns, but all of them could have been
dealt with as much as they would be dealt with in the legal context. I feel as though most of the
feminist groups were duped (by anti-religion activists) or misinformed (by radical secularists) into
calling for the prohibition of all religious arbitration through fear mongering based on the decon-
textualized, albeit legitimate, experiences of women who came from oppressive regimes. Decon-
textualized because they were speaking of oppression in dictatorships which did not operate
within a liberal multicultural and constitutional framework and because the full spectrum of
Shari’a-based laws were being applied in those jurisdictions. The discussion in our context was
restricted to private law issues.
72. Prithi Yelaja & Robert Benzie, McGuinty: No Sharia Law, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 12,
2005, at A01.
73. See Bakht, Religious Arbitration, supra note 48; see also CANADIAN SOCIETY OF MUS-
LIMS, THE MUSLIM COURT OF ARBITRATION, http://muslim-canada.org/DARLQADAMSHAH3.
html.
74. Correspondence and e-mail on file with author.
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sion may in turn impact negotiations over, inter alia, such issues as custody
of children and the mahr.75
I have also been approached by men and women who have had their
matters settled or decided by individual imams and religious leaders. In my
judgment, most of the resolutions were fair and took into consideration the
needs and interests of the parties and the contemporary context. In a small
minority of cases, however, one party or the other was forced to accept and
live with decisions that were unjust because the decision was seen as di-
vinely ordained or inspired.
Lack of knowledge about the Ontario legal regime, Islamic law, and
their rights under both systems makes it very easy for people to be duped,
coerced, and short-changed. The lack of transparency, accountability, regu-
lation, and the complexity of the interaction and interplay between the two
systems allow people to pick and choose aspects from the two systems that
best suit their immediate objectives. Ultimately, this situation makes it rela-
tively easy to leverage, manipulate, and abuse a party into extracting con-
cessions and results in potentially more exploitive settlements.
Such decisions may continue even if faith-based arbitrations were le-
gally permitted, nevertheless there would be alternatives available and some
of these options may be regulated and supervised. Moreover, a regulated
system could more efficiently and effectively interact with the state law
system in a more harmonious way. As noted by Miranda Forsyth, such a
planned legal pluralism can “ensure that the various legal systems in a par-
ticular jurisdiction operate in ways that support and enrich each other,
rather than undermine and compete with each other.”76
PART 4 – EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR FAMILY LAW
Part of the confusion and hysteria over the course of the 2003–2005
debate arose from a lack of understanding of the regime governing family
law in Ontario.77 Family law issues in the province are governed by the
Family Law Act78 and the Divorce Act.79 Consistent with the constitutional
division of powers between the federal government and the provinces, as
75. Mahr is the gift given by the groom to the bride in consideration of the marriage. In many
instances a deferred mahr is used to ensure that a wife is financially protected in the event of
divorce. This can often serve as a bargaining tool in the interaction and interplay between family
law and Islamic family law rules in the Western jurisdictions, including Canada. See Pascale
Fournier, Flirting with God in Western Secular Courts: Mahr in the West, 24 INT’L J.L. POL’Y &
FAM. 67, 67–94 (2010).
76. Miranda Forsyth, How to ‘Do’ Legal Pluralism 1 (July 2007) (unpublished working pa-
per), http://ssrn.com/abstract=993617.
77. Of course the controversy was broader than family law and encompassed other personal
areas as well. The main objections were raised in the family law context and this is the focus of
this paper.
78. R.S.O. 1990, c. F–3 (Can.).
79. R.S.C. 1985, c. 3, s. 7 (Can). Divorce is not an issue that can arbitrated.
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the name suggests, the federal Divorce Act governs divorces while the pro-
vincial Family Law Act addresses issues of property division, spousal sup-
port, child support, as well as child custody and access.80 The legislative
framework envisaged by the Family Law Act provides a default scheme in
the case of a breakdown in the relationship. These default rules have
evolved over time to reflect the changing mores of society and recognize
the value of unpaid work provided by either spouse in enabling the other
spouse to advance in his or her career. These rules also take into account
that a partner may have forfeited or prejudiced his or her career growth by
staying at home to care for children.81
Part IV of the Family Law Act also provides for parties to organize
their affairs at various stages of the relationships through domestic con-
tracts.82 There are three types of domestic contracts: marriage contracts,
cohabitation agreements, and separation agreements.83 Common law con-
tractual rules apply to the interpretation and enforceability of such con-
tracts. Application may be made to a court for the setting aside of a
domestic contract in one of the following three instances: (1) a party has
failed to disclose to the other significant assets or debts that existed at the
time the contract was entered into; (2) a party did not understand the nature
or consequences of the contract; or (3) for general reasons at contract law
such as undue influence, mistake, etc.84 Courts therefore reserve the power
to set aside agreements for a wide range of issues, in addition to their inher-
ent parens patriae jurisdiction to act in the best interest of protected persons
(including children).85
80. There are also federal guidelines when it comes to support payments.
81. See also Audrey Macklin, Post-Neoliberal Multiculturalism: The Case of Faith-Based
Arbitration, Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association
(June 1–3, 2006), http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2006/Macklin.pdf.
82. Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F–3, ss. 51–60 (Can.).
83. Id. at s. 51.
84. Id. at s. 56(4).
85. See Bakht, Family Arbitration, supra note 6, at 5–7, for a detailed discussion of when
and under what circumstances courts can intervene. The courts zealously guard their right to
intervene for various reasons, particularly their parens patriae (“parent of the nation”) jurisdiction
to ensure that the best interest of any children or others under guardianship are taken into account.
The parens patriae jurisdiction is . . . founded on necessity, namely the need to act for
the protection of those who cannot care for themselves. The courts have frequently
stated that it is to be exercised in the “best interest” of the protected person, or again, for
his or her “benefit” or “welfare.” While the Superior Court retains a residual jurisdiction
to use the parens patriae power, it will not do so lightly. This jurisdiction is to be exer-
cised to protect children and other vulnerable individuals, not their parents . . . . The
courts have determined that parens patriae is available in two situations: to fill a legisla-
tive gap or on judicial review.
M.D.R. v. Ontario (Deputy Registrar General), [2006] O.J. No. 2268, para. 80–81 (S.C.J.). It
should also be noted that a court may set aside support provisions or a waiver of support in a
contract, under the authority granted it in accordance with s. 33 of the Family Law Act. A court
may exercise its authority under this section if: the waiver or the provision results in unconsciona-
ble circumstances; the waiver or provision means that the prospective recipient must instead de-
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Those opposed to family matters being arbitrated were under the false
perception that the default provisions automatically and mandatorily gov-
erned all relationship breakdowns that proceeded to be resolved by means
other than arbitration. As aspirational or desirable as this may be, the reality
is that even when matters proceed through lawyers or the legal system, par-
ties usually do not pursue their maximum entitlements as set out in the
legislation. Indeed, the system allows parties to opt out of much of the pro-
cess and substance of the statutory regime. Parties can negotiate and settle
issues of property, support (spousal and child), as well as custody and ac-
cess using any of the numerous options available to resolve disputes or
simply not deal with it at all and walk away.86 Nobody, including the state,
can force anyone to pursue the default provisions or legal entitlements
under the family law regime or otherwise.87 The only mandatory dispute
resolution option is the court system in the sense that a party filing a claim
or bringing an action or application through the courts can compel the other
party to respond. Even in such situations, however, the initiating party must
take the first step in filing the matter in court and serving the other party.
Generally, an affected party is under no obligation to enforce its rights—
whether it be through the courts or otherwise. In theory and contrary to
perception, it is impossible to force someone to arbitrate against his or her
will. In practice, people could be coerced and pressured to submit to ADR
processes. This concern, of course, exists in both regulated and unregulated
ADR. In fact, this reality strengthens the argument for government over-
sight and regulation of faith-based ADR.
With the exception of the no-settlement option, in any of the resolution
options available to parties, they will negotiate and may compromise for
less than the full legal entitlements or minimums established in legislation.
They can also hold out and negotiate for more if they wish. The resulting
settlements or agreements may or may not be formalized and may or may
not be filed in court. Even when such agreements are filed in court as part
of an uncontested divorce, for instance, the courts simply rubber stamp
them; courts do not generally inquire into whether they are unfair, uncon-
scionable, or violate public policy. There is no judicial oversight except
pend on public assistance; or if there is a default in the support payment. Family Law Act, R.S.O.
1990, c. F–3, s. 33 (Can.).
86. They could do it themselves with or without the use of self-help kits, which are available
on the internet and in stationary stores; use the services of a paralegal (who may or may not act for
both parties) and settle it as an uncontested matter; settle the issues with the help of family, peers,
or religious/community leaders; use the same lawyer to resolve these issues again as an uncon-
tested matter; go to separate lawyers and even in this case most of the matters are settled through
negotiation and compromise; they can use one of the ADR options; and lastly, decide not to
resolve the matter at all and simply walk away.
87. A court can intervene for a number of reasons if requested to do so by way of an action,
application for judicial review, or appeal. Suffice it to note that these same avenues and interven-
tions would be available in the context of arbitral awards. See Bakht, Family Arbitration, supra
note 6.
2010] MYTH AND REALITY OF “SHARI’A COURTS” IN CANADA 575
when a party (or public guardian if a minor is involved) decides to chal-
lenge the decision or bring it to the attention of the courts in an active
manner. Such agreements and settlements are treated as legally binding and
the parties move on without any state oversight or intrusion to protect the
vulnerable or weaker party. In essence, within certain constraints, the par-
ties are free to use the default provisions or they can bargain according to
their own values, priorities, and preferences in ordering their affairs during
their relationship or in resolving issues at the end of the relationship.
It was therefore surprising to hear opponents of faith-based arbitration
and the Premier of Ontario use the expression “one law for all” in denying
orthodox Muslims just this benefit.88 In a position paper on the tribunal by
the CCMW, CCMW president Alia Hogben wrote: “[We] see[ ] no compel-
ling reason to live under any other form of law in Canada, as we want the
same laws to apply to us as to other Canadian women. We like the Charter
of Rights and Freedoms, which safeguard and protect our equality rights.”89
This statement leaves the inaccurate impression, however, that Ontario
Muslims would be forced to refer matters to the tribunal and that this initia-
tive was being carved out exclusively for Muslims. As Natasha Bakht, who
wrote a report that various women’s groups used in opposing faith-based
arbitration, points out in a reconsidered article published after the
controversy:
In fact, it is disingenuous to speak of “one law for all” when On-
tario’s family law permits parties to opt out of the default statu-
tory regime such as the equal division of matrimonial property.
Parties can, through negotiation, mediation or arbitration, based
on the right to contract freely, agree to almost any resolution of
their marital affairs . . . . [C]ouples’ decisions to settle their fam-
ily law affairs are generally left un-reviewed by the courts.90
If the right existed for people to opt out of the existing family law regime,
why should religious Canadians be prevented from structuring settlements
consistent with their values and beliefs, again subject to the usual contrac-
tual and common law protections and mechanisms for review?
88. The Premier declared “There will be no Shariah law in Ontario. There will be no relig-
ious arbitration in Ontario. There will be one law for all Ontarians.” Keith Leslie, McGuinty
Rejects Ontario’s Use of Shariah and All Religious Arbitrations, CANADIAN PRESS, Sept. 11,
2005, available at http://www.nosharia.com/McGuinty%20rejects%20Ontario’s%20use%20of%
20Sharia%20Law%20and%20all%20religious%20arbitration.htm.
89. Position Statement on the Proposed Implementation of Sections of Muslim Law [Sharia]
in Canada, CAN. COUNCIL MUSLIM WOMEN (May 25, 2004), http://www.ccmw.com/activities/
act_arb_muslimlaw_sharia.html.
90. Bakht, Muslim Barbarians, supra note 29, at 15–16. Her first article essentially reviewed
the problems with allowing faith-based arbitration. The article did acknowledge that these
problems existed in the family law area irrespective of whether matters were being resolved
through the legal system or through arbitration and whether or not religious principles were being
used. The piece, however, concluded against allowing faith-based arbitrations based on the secular
nature of society. Bakht, Family Arbitration, supra note 6.
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The crucial point to note is that where parties do not proceed through
the courts and resolve matters privately, which is the case in a significant
number of disputes, a court may never see the contract, settlement, or
award.91 These very important and critical details were either ignored or
downplayed by opponents of faith-based arbitration, leaving the impression
that all family matters settled outside arbitration would fully comport with
the provinces’ family law regime.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, concerns about women not being able
to knowingly consent, the unequal bargaining power in some cases, and the
fear about privatization of justice are legitimate and must not be minimized.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to dwell on the details of these objec-
tions, other than to state that the first two concerns exist in the non-ADR
legal setting and society as a whole. With respect to the third issue, there is
a clear trend in our society to explore options outside of the mainstream
adversarial model. More importantly, all three issues do not necessarily im-
ply or require that such tribunals must be banned. In fact, it merely rein-
forces the argument that procedures and practices must be developed and
improved in both the ADR as well as the mainstream adversarial legal arena
to ensure that women, and more generally the vulnerable, are protected.92
There are alternative options between the two extremes of outright banning
of faith-based arbitration and allowing it without any additional checks and
balances. Indeed, as Jehan Aslam points out:
There is no reason to believe, however, that an arbitrator is inca-
pable of creating a neutral forum and a process through which
each party can present his or her case without fear of retribution
from other parties. Efforts can be made to address social isolation
by requiring that the arbitrator hearing a specific case ensure that
parties are aware of their rights under both sets of laws [Canadian
and Islamic].93
Such an approach will mean that religious norms and practices are evalu-
ated on their own merits and constrained within the bounds of Ontario law.
91. There may be an exception to this when it comes to child support, child custody and
access issues, and spousal support. Courts may have to approve any child support arrangements,
even if privately made, where a party sought a divorce through the courts. Courts may intervene
when requested to by a party or theoretically on their own through their inherent parens patraie
jurisdiction to intervene in settlements and agreements on behalf of protected persons. They may
also intervene in spousal support agreements. Again, in both these cases, the court may intervene
only when and if the matters are brought to court or come to the attention of the courts one way or
another. The situation would not be any different in the context of arbitration. See Bakht, Family
Arbitration, supra note 6.
92. See BOYD, supra note 5; see also Jehan Aslam, Judicial Oversight of Islamic Family Law
Arbitration in Ontario: Ensuring Meaningful Consent and Promoting Multicultural Citizenship,
38 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 841, 852 (2006).
93. Aslam, supra note 92, at 852–53.
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PART 5 – ISLAM AND ITS LEGAL SYSTEM
Both sides of the debate realized the significance of the battle over the
place of Islamic law and its relationship to state law in a Western liberal
democratic context. Opponents speculated that a victory by the “fundamen-
talists” in Canada would give credence to those who stand behind Shari’a in
Muslim countries to the detriment of women. This ignored the fact that only
very limited aspects of Islamic laws would have been engaged in the pro-
posed initiative—matters that were already subject to private contractual
negotiations or where legislation provided for the right to opt out. Moreo-
ver, it also betrayed the evolutionary and context-specific nature of Islamic
law.
An appreciation of the sources, major principles, depth, and dynamism
of the Shari’a is imperative to understand how institutionalized faith-based
arbitration in Ontario could have contributed to the indigenization process
of Islamic law. Before embarking on an introduction to the Shari’a, it is
helpful to briefly look at the ideological framework of Islam. The word
Islam means submission to God.94 It is derived from the word salaam,
which means peace.95 The Shari’a is the path to achieve this submission.96
The Shari’a aims to fulfill both spiritual and material welfare, as Islam envi-
sions no separation between the temporal and the spiritual:
In Islam it is reality which appears as Church looked at from one
point of view and State from another. It is not true to say that
Church and State are two sides or facets of the same thing. Islam
is a single unanalyzable reality which is one or the other, as your
point of view varies.97
The essence of the belief system is the absolute authority of God:
“[t]here can be no doubt that the essence of Islamic civilization is Islam; or
that the essence of Islam is tawhid, the act of affirming Allah to be the One,
absolute, transcendent Creator, Lord and Master of all that is.”98 The belief
in the supremacy of God results in the inescapable conclusion that God’s
creation must serve and fulfill His will. Therefore, in Islam God is the
source of authority and the sole sovereign lawgiver.99 The Shari’a is divine
94. THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ISLAM 144 (John L. Esposito ed., 2003); GAI EATON, ISLAM
AND THE DESTINY OF MAN 36 (1985); JOHN L. ESPOSITO, ISLAM: THE STRAIGHT PATH 14 (1988).
See generally FAZLUR RAHMAN, ISLAM (1968).
95. THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ISLAM, supra note 94, at 274.
96. ESPOSITO, supra note 94, at 14.
97. MOHAMMED IQBAL, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT IN ISLAM 154 (1974).
98. Ismail R. al-Faruqi & Lois Lamya al-Faruqi, The Essence of Islamic Civilization, I-
EPISTEMOLOGY.NET, http://i-epistemology.net/ismail-faruqi/161-the-essence-of-islamic-
civilization.html. See ISMA’IL RAJI AL FARUQI, AL TAWHID: ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THOUGHT AND
LIFE (3rd ed. 1995), for a good introductory discussion on the supremacy of God or tawhid. See
also THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ISLAM, supra note 94, at 317.
99. QUR’AN, sura Qasas 12:40 (“The command is for none but God. He hath commanded
that ye worship none but Him.”); QUR’AN 7:54 (“Is it not His to create and to govern?”).
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and eternal, not in letter but in spirit.100 All human legislation must conform
to the divine will as discerned from the Qur’an and Sunnah and understand-
ing of al dhawq al shar’i, or intuitive knowledge of the purposes of the
law.101 God created human beings with the potential to ascertain the divine
imperatives, as Islam teaches that humans are distinguished from God’s
other creations by the mere fact that humans can think rationally.102
In order to appreciate the depth and comprehensiveness of Shari’a, it is
necessary to understand Islamic law’s various sources and mechanisms for
evolution as well as the history and evolution of Islamic thought. As Asaf
Fyzee noted:
Islamic law is not a systematic code, but a living and growing
organism; nevertheless there is amongst its different schools a
large measure of agreement, because the starting point and the
basic principles are identical. The differences that exist are due to
historical, political, economic and cultural reasons, and it is,
therefore, obvious that this system cannot be studied without a
proper regard to its historical development.103
Revelation provided both the principles and the mechanism for its re-
newal in order for the Shari’a to conform to changing human conditions.
The fundamental principles of the law and the methodology for its develop-
ment were instituted in Islam under divine instruction.104
During the Prophet Muhammad’s lifetime, solutions to legal problems
were settled by resorting to the Prophet, who relied on his inspired interpre-
tation of the divine revelation or data revelata.105 The Prophet also relied
extensively on consultation with his companions and others in formulating
legal opinions, among other things.106 After the demise of the Prophet, his
companions had to extrapolate, infer, and deduce legal prescriptions from
their knowledge of the first principles of Islamic understanding of life and
reality.107 Twenty-seven companions of Prophet Muhammad distinguished
100. Kamali, supra note 7, at 216–17, 230; AHMAD HASAN, THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF
ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 7 (1970) (“Abu Hanifah . . . distinguished din from shari’ah on the
ground that din was never changed, whereas shari’ah continued to change through history.”).
101. See HASAN, supra note 100, at 34; THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ISLAM, supra note 94, at
287–88.
102. WING-TSIT CHAN ET AL., THE GREAT ASIAN RELIGIONS: AN ANTHOLOGY 309 (1969)
(“Islam puts its trust in reason, the supreme faculty of knowledge with which man is endowed, as
the only method possible for ever deciding the issue.”).
103. ASAF A.A. FYZEE, OUTLINES OF MUHAMMADAN LAW 1 (1964).
104. See generally MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, SHARIAH LAW: AN INTRODUCTION (2008).
105. ISMAIL R. AL FARUQI & LOIS LAMYA AL FARUQI, THE CULTURAL ATLAS OF ISLAM 274
(1986); FYZEE, supra note 103, at 31–32.
106. Fathi Osman, Islam in a Modern State: Democracy and the Concept of Shura (Occasional
Paper Series, 2001), http://www.usc.edu/schools/college/crcc/private/cmje/issues/more_issues/
Islam_in_a_Modern_State__Democracy_and_Shura.pdf.
107. HASAN, supra note 100, at xiv.
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themselves as legal experts.108 Included among them were the four caliphs
in order of their rule, Abu Bakr al Siddiq, Umar Ibn al Khattab, Uthman Ibn
Affan, and Ali Ibn Abu Talib as well as two of the Prophet’s wives, Umm
Salamah and ‘A’ishah.109 Umar, Ali, and ‘A’ishah had a great impact on
the development of Islamic law, since the two early schools of jurispru-
dence, the jurists of Medinah and Kufa (Iraq), derived their legal doctrines
from their verdicts, among others.110 Indeed, Abu Abu Salamah ibn Abd al-
Rahman, one of the seven eminent jurists of Medinah in the second genera-
tion and a disciple of ‘A’ishah said about her:
I have never seen anyone more knowledgeable about the Pro-
phetic traditions than ‘A’ishah; nor anyone who can surpass her
in her grasp of fiqh (jurisprudence) and her ability to express her-
self on any issue that crops up. I have yet to meet someone who
possesses such in-depth knowledge of every particular verse in
the Qur’an as to the precise occasion of its revelation . . . .111
Similar testimonials have been reported about her outstanding expertise in
fiqh from numerous scholars such as Ata and al-Zuhir, among others.
Thanks to this, she was often consulted by caliphs, judges, and jurists, and
the number of scholars who learned from her has been estimated to be over
three hundred, including men and women.112
The practice of the Prophet’s companions was to first consult the
Qur’an, and then the Sunnah.113 If these two primary sources were silent,
they resorted to extrapolating and deducing from the first principles gleaned
from the two divinely inspired sources.114 Umar, the second caliph of Islam,
instituted the body of legal opinions of some of the companions as a tertiary
source that could be consulted by later jurists, or fuqaha.115 It is clear that
Islamic law has three distinguishable facets: revelation (the Qur’an and the
108. Id; see also IBN AL-QAYYIM AL-JAWZIYYA & 
.
TAHA ‘ABD AL-RA’UF SA‘D, A‘LAM AL-
MUWAQQI‘IN ‘AN RABB AL-‘ALAMIN 12–14 (1973). Ibn al-Qayyim mentions some 130 compan-
ions who had become well known in issuing rulings. Among these, seven had been recognized as
being most prolific: ‘Umar, ‘Ali, ‘Abd Allah ibn Mas’ud, ‘A’ishah, Zayd ibn Thabit, Abd Allah
ibn ‘Abbas, and ‘Abd Allah ibn ‘Umar.
109. See Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Law and Society: The Interplay of Revelation and Rea-
son in the Shariah, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF ISLAM 107, 111–12 (John L. Esposito ed., 1999).
110. Id. at 112.
111. IBN HAJAR AL-‘ASQALANI, TAQRIB AL-TAHDHIB, 12, 115 (1975); cf. SA‘ID FAYIZ
DUKHAYYIL & MU
.
HAMMAD RAWWAS QAL‘AH’JIL, MAWSU’AT FIQH UMM AL-MU’MININ 30 (1st
ed. 1989).
112. ‘ABD AL-MUN’IM AL-HAFANI, MAWSU’AT UMM AL-MU’MININ ‘A’ISHAH BINT ABI BAKR
7–11 (1st ed. 2003).
113. See generally Kamali, supra note 109, at 111 (noting the method of the Companions).
114. See id. (“The Companions frequently resorted to personal reasoning and consultation in
the determination of issues.”).
115. FARUQI & FARUQI, supra note 105, at 275. Fuqaha (jurists) is the plural of faqih. Hafiz
Nazeem Goolam, Gender Equaliy in Islamic Family Law, in UNDERSTANDING ISLAMIC LAW 122
(Hisham Ramadan ed., 2006).
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Sunnah, which is also considered inspired), interpretation, and
application.116
A century after the death of the Prophet, none of the companions were
alive, leaving a vacuum in the legal field.117 The earlier generation knew
about the situational contexts and spirit of Islam and the Prophet’s mis-
sion,118 and they were thus in a position to legislate with these guidelines in
mind. It was believed that later Muslims were going to be deprived of these
advantages if these experiences were not recorded for posterity. The
Qur’an, as will be discussed in the next section, had already been commit-
ted to writing. Therefore, the early Muslim jurists and scholars set out to
canonize the Sunnah and invented fiqh to systematize the development of
the law.119 Fiqh is divided into two components: usul al fiqh and furu’ al
fiqh.120 Usul al fiqh is the science of jurisprudence, covering the origins and
sources from which the rules of human conduct are derived; it includes the
philosophy of law, sources of rules, and the principles of legislation, inter-
pretation, and application of the Qur’an and Sunnah.121 Furu’ al fiqh are the
derivatives or the legal rules; these are subject to change.122
There evolved much scholarship in this area and numerous schools of
jurisprudence developed; they began along geographical lines, in Medinah
and Kufa (Iraq), but later evolved around individual scholars or jurists.123
Due to historical and political factors, four schools of jurisprudence sur-
vived in the Sunni tradition.124 The four schools of Sunni jurisprudence are
named after their respective founders: the Hanafi school (Abu Hanifah, d.
767), the Maliki school (Malik ibn Anas, d. 795), the Shafi’i school
116. A. Z. HAMMAD, ISLAMIC LAW: UNDERSTANDING JURISTIC DIFFERENCES 10 (1992).
117. FARUQI & FARUQI, supra note 105, at 275.
118. See Kamali, supra note 109, at 111 (noting the Companions as “direct recipients” of the
Prophet’s teachings).
119. See generally id. at 110–16 (giving a brief history of fiqh and Sunnah).
120. Kamali, supra note 109, at 110; Irshad Abdal-Haqq, Islamic Law: An Overview of its
Origin and Elements, 7 J. ISLAMIC L. & CULTURE 27, 50 (2002); see also Kamali, supra note 7, at
216.
121. See M. Cherif Bassiouni & Gamal M. Badr, The Shari’ah: Sources, Interpretation, and
Rule-Making, 1 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 135, 135–37 (2002); THE OXFORD DICTIONARY
OF ISLAM, supra note 94, at 329. For a more detailed discussion, see Wael B. Hallaq, Usul Al-
Fiqh: Beyond Tradition, 3 J. ISLAMIC STUD. 172 (1992).
122. Kamali, supra note 109, at 110.
123. According to the great Islamic philosopher and legal scholar Muhammad Iqbal, “[F]rom
about the middle of the first century up to the beginning of the fourth not less than nineteen
schools of law and legal opinion appeared in Islam. This fact alone is sufficient to show how
incessantly our early doctors of law worked in order to meet the necessities of a growing civiliza-
tion.” IQBAL, supra note 97, at 165; see also Kamali, supra note 109, at 112–13.
124. Kamali, supra note 109, at 112–13. The two main branches of Islam are the Sunni and
the Shia (or Shiites). The schism occurred after the arbitration between Ali ibn Abi Talib and
Mu’awiyah ibn Abi Sufyan for the Caliphate. Fred M. Donner, Muhammed and the Caliphate:
Political History of the Islamic Empire up to the Mongol Conquest, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF
ISLAM, supra note 109, at 1. The Shia insisted that the Caliphate had to remain in the family of the
Prophet (represented by his cousin Ali), while the Sunni tradition did not insist on this.
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(Muhammad ibn Idris, d. 819), and the Hanbali school (Ahmad ibn Hanbal,
d. 855).125 The early era was a period of great intellectual progress. George
Makdisi documents that the scholastic method of disputation and lecture
was developed by Islamic jurists in the ninth century, a method which was
later used in Bologna, Paris, Oxford, and elsewhere referred to as “read-
ings” and “moots.”126
A. Sources and Methodology of Islamic Law
1. Qur’an
The Qur’an is composed of 114 suwar (chapters), 6,616 aayat (verses),
and 77,934 words.127 Most of the revelations to Prophet Muhammad had a
situational context, referred to as asbab al nuzul (the situational causes of
revelation).128 Many orientalists proclaim that the Prophet produced the
Qur’an himself, but at the same time, they do not deny that the existing text
is unaltered. By unaltered, the orientalists mean that the Qur’an is written
exactly as it was dictated to the Prophet’s scribes.129 William Muir con-
cluded that “we may upon the strongest presumption affirm that every verse
in the Kor’an is the genuine and unaltered composition of Mohammad him-
self.”130 Muslims, on the contrary, believe that the Qur’an is the actual ver-
batim revelation sent by God; it is a commonly known fact that Muhammad
was illiterate and could not have composed the work himself.131
The Qur’an is believed to be the last revelation sent to mankind—it
encompasses and reforms many of the earlier revelations sent to other
prophets, including the Psalms of David, the Torah of Moses, and the Bible
as revealed to Jesus.132 Muslims see the Qur’an as the culmination of the
evolutionary process of revelation.133 The Qur’an is not a legal treatise, but
rather lays down certain guidelines and general principles for the attainment
125. Vincent J. Cornell, Fruit of the Tree of Knowledge: The Relationship Between Faith and
Practice in Islam, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF ISLAM, supra note 109, at 94–95. This Article will
focus on Sunni jurisprudence, as this is the prevalent system in most of the Islamic world, includ-
ing the Middle East.
126. George Makdisi, The Guilds of Law in Medieval Legal History: An Inquiry into the Ori-
gins of the Inns of Court, 34 CLEV. ST. REV. 3 (1985).
127. FARUQI & FARUQI, supra note 105, at 100.
128. See THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ISLAM, supra note 94, at 25 (defining Asbab al-Nuzul).
129. WILLIAM MUIR, THE LIFE OF MOHAMMAD xxvi–xxvii (1923).
130. Id. at xxviii.
131. Donner, supra note 124, at 6–7; see also Abdal-Haqq, supra note 120, at 40.
132. Donner, supra note 124, at 7.
133. Muslims believe that unlike the previous revelations sent from God, the text of the
Qur’an has been preserved intact. At the time of the Prophet’s death nearly 30,000 people had
memorized the Qur’an (Muslims must recite the Qur’an from memory in their 5 daily prayers and
other occasions). Moreover, being illiterate, the prophet had scribes write the revelations, which
were compiled and distributed. One of the early copies still exists in Central Asia. See FARUQI &
FARUQI, supra, note 99, at 100 (“Its grammar, syntax, idioms, literary forms—the media of ex-
pression and the constituents of literary beauty—all are still the same as they were in the Prophet’s
time.”).
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of an ideal civilized society.134 Thus, the Qur’an, with the aid of the Sunnah
(precedent set by Prophet Muhammad), ijma (community consensus), qiyas
(analogical reasoning), ijtihad (independent reasoning or intellectual effort),
and urf (custom) can be used as a basis upon which to build a body of
law.135 Only 350 verses of the Qur’an address legal issues; most of these
were revealed in response to problems that were actually encountered (al-
ahkam al amaliyyah or practical rulings pertaining to the conduct of the
individuals).136
Islamic legal scholars are unanimous in the view that the Qur’an is the
primary source of the Shari’a, although this statement does not occur fre-
quently in the early Muslim jurists’ writings.137 Muslims believe that unlike
revelation, humanity’s understanding of Shari’a is fallible. Islamic scholars,
therefore, do not feel that there is any contradiction between reason and
revelation; reason exists to correct man’s erroneous understanding of the
data revelata.138
The additional sources and methodologies elaborated upon below as-
sist in the interpretation of, and/or discovery of, the divine will.
2. Sunnah
The Sunnah refers to the normative behaviors, decisions, actions, and
tacit approvals and disapprovals of the Prophet.139 The Sunnah was heard,
witnessed, memorized, recorded, and transmitted from generation to gener-
ation (as the Arabs had a great oral tradition).140 Beginning in the third
century, Sunnah were compiled into collections of traditions, known as
ahadith (plural of hadith).141 Over time, six of these collections became the
most authoritative, or sihah, collections: al Bukhari (256/870), Muslim
(251/865), Abu Dawud (275/888), al Tirmidhi (279/892), al Nasa’i (303/
915), Ibn Majah (273/886).142 The al Bukhari and Muslim remain the most
134. Donner, supra note 124, at 7.
135. Bassiouni & Badr, supra note 121, at 140–41; THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ISLAM, supra
note 94, at 133–34, 254–55, 305, 328 (defining Sunnah, Ijma, Qiyas, Ijtihad, and Urf,
respectively).
136. Kamali, supra note 109, at 119–20. Indeed, “less than 3 percent of the [Qur’an] deals
with legal matters.” Id. at 119.
137. This is attributed to the fact that this was too evident to be stressed at the time. There is
ample proof that the Qur’an was used as an authoritative source of Islamic law. See, e.g., Zafar
Ishaq Ansari, An Early Discussion on Islamic Jurisprudence: Some Notes on al-Raad ‘ala Siyar
al-Awza’i, in ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVES: STUDIES IN HONOUR OF MAWLANA SAYYID ABUL A’LA
MAWDUDI 147, 150 (Khurshid Ahmad & Zafar Ishaq Ansari eds., 1979); HASAN, supra note 100,
at 12–20.
138. See FARUQI & FARUQI, supra note 105, at 265.
139. THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ISLAM, supra note 94, at 305.
140. FARUQI & FARUQI, supra note 105, at 114; Bassiouni & Badr, supra note 121, at 150–51.
141. FARUQI & FARUQI, supra note 105, at 114; Cornell, supra note 125, at 74.
142. FARUQI & FARUQI, supra note 105, at 114; Cornell, supra note 125, at 74–75.
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respected of the six sihah texts.143 The authenticity of the sihah is based on
the scrutiny of references, the crosschecking of witnesses (employed by col-
lectors), and the isnad.144 The isnad is the credibility of the chain of author-
ities attesting to the accuracy of a particular tradition.145 In the early years
of Islam, scholarship also flowered in the study of Sunnah through usul al
hadith (the science of hadith).146 The aforementioned traditions elaborate
on the principles laid down in the Qur’an.147
3. Ijma, Qiyas, and Ijtihad
Qiyas is reasoning by analogy to solve a new legal problem.148 Ac-
cording to Wael Hallaq, qiyas encompasses the a fortiori argument in both
its forms, the a minori ad maius and a maiori ad minus, reductio ad ab-
surdum, and induction.149 The only argument not included is the argmen-
tum e contrario, which is considered a linguistic argument in usul al fiqh.150
Ijtihad is defined as the intellectual effort by a mujtahid (one who is
qualified to do ijtihad, a jurisconsult) in deriving rules consistent with the
first principles of Islam.151 Ijtihad can refer to the use of qiyas to extend a
143. FARUQI & FARUQI, supra note 105, at 114; Cornell, supra note 125, at 74; THE OXFORD
DICTIONARY OF ISLAM, supra note 94, at 273.
144. Bassiouni & Badr, supra note 121, at 151 (citing ABU ALI FARISI, JAWAHIR AL-USUL FI
ILM HADITH AL-RASUL (1969)).
145. Id. (citing ABD ALLAH IBN QUTAYBA, TA’WIL MUKHTALAFAT AL-HADITH (1936)); THE
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ISLAM, supra note 94, at 151.
146. See generally Bassiouni & Badr, supra note 121, at 164–65 (citing MUHAMMAD IBN ALI
SHAWKANI, KITAB IRSHAD AL-FUHUL ILA TAHQIQ AL-HAQQ MIN ILM AL-USUL (1909); ZAKARIYA
AL-BIRRI, USUL AL-FIQH AL-ISLAMI (1980)) (stating that independent reasoning has become easier
than in the past because the Qur’anic sciences and science of hadith flourished in the early years
of Islam).
147. Id. at 152.
148. See Ahmad Hasan, The Definition of Qiyas in Islamic Jurisprudence, 19 ISLAMIC STUD.
1, 22 (1980) (explaining the various definitions of qiyas); see also Abdul Hamid A. Abusulayman,
Islamization of Knowledge: A New Approach Toward Reform of Contemporary Knowledge, in
ISLAM: SOURCE AND PURPOSE OF KNOWLEDGE 106 (1988) (“The effect of time and place and a
method of Qiyas, which ensures arriving at conclusions that are not limited by time and place but
are in keeping with the spirit of the Prophet’s Sunnah.”); Wael B. Hallaq, Legal Reasoning in
Islamic Law and the Common Law: Logic and Method, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 79 (1985) (discuss-
ing the role of logic, deduction, induction, and legal analogy in Islamic law); John Makdisi, Legal
Logic and Equity in Islamic Law, 32 AM. J. COMP. L. 63 (1985) (discussing the nature of Islamic
legal reasoning).
149. Hallaq, supra note 148, at 80.
150. See id. at 80 n.2. See generally Wael B. Hallaq, Non-Analogical Arguments in Sunni
Judicial Qiyas, 36 ARABICA 286, 286–306 (1989).
151. See THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ISLAM, supra note 94, at 134, 214 (defining ijtihad and
mujtahid, respectively); Bassiouni & Badr, supra note 121, at 173. Some scholars discuss ijtihad
as part of qiyas, others discuss it as a separate category. See HASAN, supra note 100; Ansari, supra
note 137; Abdul Ghafur Muslim, Islamic Laws in Historical Perspective: An Investigation Into the
Problems and Principles in the Field of Islamization, 31 ISLAMIC Q. 71 (1987) (“It must be kept in
mind, however, that if this mechanical application of Qiyas were to result in judgments which are
unjust or against the public interest, or where the revealed sources are silent on some confronting
issue then there may be a need to exert independent judgment, namely Ijtihad.”).
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rule or the act of independently taking account of the maqasid al shari’a
(the higher purposes or objectives of the Shari’a).152 The six maqasid al
Shari’a are: preservation of life, property, family, religion, honor or dignity,
and al aql (reason or rational knowledge).153 To carry out these techniques
it was imperative that jurists “be familiar with the broad purposes of the
Law, so that when choices are to be made they will be able to choose inter-
pretations which accord with the spirit of the Law.”154
In principle, the Shari’a permits legal rules to be changed and modified
in accordance with changing circumstances.155 Prominent Islamic jurist Ibn
al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya, for instance, notes:
Whoever issues rulings to the people merely on the basis of what
is transmitted in the compendia despite differences in their cus-
toms, usages, times, conditions and the special circumstances of
their situations has gone astray and leads others astray. His crime
against the religion is greater than the crime of a physician who
gives people medical prescriptions without regard to the differ-
ences of their climes, norms, the times they live in, and their
physical conditions but merely in accordance with what he finds
written down in some medical book about people with similar
anatomies. Such is an ignorant physician; the other is an ignorant
jurisconsult but more detrimental.156
Muhammad Iqbal referred to ijtihad as “[t]he principle of movement in
the structure of Islam.”157 The justification for qiyas and ijtihad is found in
the Qur’an and Sunnah.158 Scholars have identified three ways ijtihad can
operate: (1) with regard to speculative (zanni) textual rulings in the Qur’an
and Sunnah due to meaning (dalalah) or transmission (riwayah), then ij-
tihad can be employed to determine the correct interpretation that is in har-
mony with the objectives and higher purposes of the law; (2) where there is
152. See Kamali, supra note 7, at 224 (stating the three capacities in which the ijtihad
operates).
153. See id. at 229.
154. Bernard Weiss, Interpretation in Islamic Law: The Theory of Ijtihad, 26 AM. J. COMP. L.
199, 210 (1978).
155. See Kamali, supra note 7, at 223.
156. AL-JAWZIYYA & SA‘D, supra note 108, at 202; cf. Muhammad Faruq Abdullah, Creativ-
ity, Innovation, and Heresy in Islam, in 5 VOICES OF ISLAM 13 (Vincent J. Cornell ed., 2007).
157. IQBAL, supra note 97, at 148.
158. THE HOLY QUR’AN 38:29 (Abdullah Yusuf Ali trans., 2d U.S. ed. 1988) (“[Here is] a
Book which We have sent down unto thee, full of blessings, That they may meditate On its Signs,
and that Men of understanding may Receive admonition.”). See also QUR’AN, sura Qasas 29:69
(“And those who strive In Our (Cause)—We will Certainly guide them To Our Paths: For verily
God Is with those Who do right.”). The most authentic Hadith concerning qiyas and ijtihad is the
appointment of Mu’adh ibn Jabal as a judge for Yemen. Prior to departure, he was asked,
“[a]ccording to what will you judge?” Mu’adh responded, “[a]ccording to the book of God.”
Again he was asked, “[a]nd, if you do not find it therein?” and Mu’adh responded “According to
the Sunnah of the Prophet.” “And, if it is not therein?” Mu’adh replied, “[t]hen I will exert myself
to from my own judgment.” Omer Ibn Hattab, the Caliph, approved of this response. MUHAMMAD
IBN AL-SARAKHSI ET AL., 16 KITAB AL-MABSUT 69 (1906).
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no nass (clear injunction) or ijma (consensus), then resort can be made to
ijtihad with the guiding factor being the maqasid al-Shari’a—this is known
as ijtihad bi al ray (ijtihad founded in opinion); and (3) with respect to
existing rules of fiqh, which originated from analogical reasoning (qiyas),
juristic preference (istihsan) and other forms of ijtihad, then the mujtahid
may perform fresh ijtihad if these rulings no longer serve the higher objec-
tives of the Shari’a in light of, inter alia, new social, economic, political, or
cultural considerations.159
The Shari’a identifies three factors that must be kept in mind in pursu-
ing the maqasid al-Shari’a, or objectives of the law.160 These factors in-
clude: educating the individual (tahdhib al-fard) to inspire faith and instill
the qualities of trustworthiness and righteousness; establishing justice
(‘adl), which is one of the major themes of the Qur’an; and considerating
the public interest (maslahah).161
Ijma, or consensus of the community, is a third source of Islamic
law.162 Once a fresh ijtihad or qiyas has been completed and a consensus
develops around it (ratification by the community), then it becomes part of
the corpus juris of Islamic law.163 The ijma of an earlier generation is not
binding on future generations.164
Other techniques and principles that one should be aware of when ana-
lyzing the Shari’a include: Naskh (a technique where verses of the Qur’an
are abrogated or abrogation of one Sunnah by another Sunnah and cross-
abrogation of Qur’an and Sunnah); al tamassuk bil asl (the rule that all
beneficial actions are legitimate and all harmful ones illegitimate); istishab
al hal (the presumption in evidence law that a state of affairs known to exist
in the past is valid unless there is evidence challenging it); al masalih al
mursalah (the rule that a benefit is deemed legitimate if the Shari’a is not
159. See Kamali, supra note 7, at 224 (stating the three capacities in which the ijtihad oper-
ates). The majority of scholars agree that if the text concerns religious observances (ibadat), then
change is not possible. In cases where the text is about
worldly transactions, the majority of jurists have held that it is open to interpretation and
ijtihad. . . . [T]he dominant view is that no change should be attempted. But even so,
numerous instances can be found in the precedent of the Caliph ‘Umar bin al Khattab,
where such changes have been made even in cases of the presence of a clear text.
Id.
160. Kamali, supra note 7, at 225.
161. Id. at 225–31. There are at least fifty-three instances where the Qur’an commands adl or
justice. Id. at 227.
162. THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ISLAM, supra note 94, at 133; see generally Bernard K.
Freamon, Slavery, Freedom, and the Doctrine of Consensus in Islamic Jurisprudence, 11 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 1, 23–24, 63 (1998) (describing ijma and the scholarly debate surrounding it).
163. THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ISLAM, supra note 94, at 133. There is great debate as to
whose consensus will make ijtihad or qiyas into law. Some scholars contend it is only the consen-
sus of the jurists, while others contend it is the consensus of the community. See id.; IQBAL, supra
note 97, at 162; Abdulwahab Saleh Babeair, The Role of the Ulama in Modern Islamic Society: A
Historical Perspective, 37 ISLAMIC Q. 80, 85 (1993).
164. See IMRAN ASHAN KHAN NYAZEE, ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 182–94 (2000), for a detailed
discussion about the types of ijma and whether or not they are binding.
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known to have established or denied it); al dhara’i’ (the rule that the legiti-
macy of means is directly affected by the benefit or harm implicit in the
final end it seeks to achieve); al istiqra al naqis (the rule that a universal
law can originate from a particular law through ascending generalization, if
no exception is known to challenge the generalization); al istihsan (the rule
that a weaker qiyas may be preferred to a stronger one if the former better
fulfils the objectives of the Shari’a); and al urf wal adah (the rule that cus-
tom and established practice may be legitimate sources of law, as long as
they do not contradict the Shari’a). Urf, or custom, is of particular signifi-
cance in this context as many of the rules of international commercial arbi-
tration have evolved to the level of custom. All schools of Islamic
jurisprudence accept urf as a supplementary source of rules of law.165 Ac-
cording to Islamic legal scholar Husayn H. Hassan, “what is established by
custom is like what is stipulated (among contractual parties).”166 This being
said, custom cannot change a mandatory rule of the Shari’a.167
The foregoing is neither exhaustive, nor are the definitions comprehen-
sive. The above introduction, however, is sufficient for gaining a basic un-
derstanding of Islamic rules and laws and its evolutionary nature. In fact,
one of the difficulties in determining what makes up Islamic law is the fact
that there has been strong resistance to codification of the law, which is
derived from the Shari’a’s fundamental character as an evolutionary
system.168
PART 6 – OPPORTUNITY FOR THE INDIGENIZATION OF
ISLAMIC LEGAL RULINGS
The distinction must be made between Shari’a and many of the techni-
cal legal rules derived from the Qur’an and Sunnah through fiqh.169 A
faqih,170 or jurist, derived these rules and thus the decision is not eternal
165. Bassiouni and Badr, supra note 121, at 157–58.
166. Id. at 158 (citing HUSAYN H. HASSAN, AL-MADKHAL LI DIRASAT AL-FIQH AL ISLAMI 146,
213–17 (1981)).
167. Id.
168. See KHALED ABOU EL FADL, SPEAKING IN GOD’S NAME: ISLAMIC LAW, AUTHORITY AND
WOMEN 97 (2001) (discussing the inseparable nature of the Sunnah or hadith from the creative
practice of the juristic community).
169. Kamali, supra note 7, at 216.
170. Muslim, supra note 151, at 69 (“A Faqih means a jurist; an expert in the field of law,
who possesses outstanding knowledge of revealed sources and methodology, and the intelligence
to make use of the basic sources through independent reasoning and the principles provided by the
Shari’a.”); see also FARUQI & FARUQI, supra note 105, at 34 (“The great jurists of Islam—Shafi’
i, Abu Hanifah, Malik and Ahmad ibn Hanbal—all understood the compound term usul al fiqh—
not as the general principles of Islamic law, but the first principles of Islamic understanding of life
and reality. . . . The faqihs of the classical period were real encyclopedists, masters of practically
all the disciplines from literature and law to astronomy and medicine. They were themselves
professional men who knew Islam not only as law . . . .”).
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and is open to reinterpretation in light of, inter alia, new social, economic,
educational, and political circumstances.171 As Noah Feldman points out:
Shariah, properly understood, is not just a set of legal rules. To
believing Muslims, it is something deeper and higher, infused
with moral and metaphysical purpose. At its core, Shariah repre-
sents the idea that all human beings—and all human govern-
ments—are subject to justice under the law.
In fact, “Shariah” is not the word traditionally used in Arabic
to refer to the processes of Islamic legal reasoning or the rulings
produced through it: that word is fiqh, meaning something like
Islamic jurisprudence. The word “Shariah” connotes a connection
to the divine, a set of unchanging beliefs and principles that order
life in accordance with God’s will.172
The Islamic legal tradition differs from the Western legal tradition in
many respects, including the derivation of its legitimacy, sources, and meth-
odology for evolution or reform.173 There are, however, some similarities.
Like most Western legal systems, the Islamic legal system is a positive
system of law and not merely religious law. Additionally, both systems ap-
ply judge-made law using the case law method in their own peculiar
ways.174 Both systems also allow the governing authority to make legisla-
tion to run the affairs of the state.175
Islamic law is characterized by a strong tradition of internal legal plu-
ralism. This is evident from the fact that numerous schools of jurisprudence
(with varying degrees of flexibility) existed throughout history.176 Five
prominent schools (whose fiqh rulings continue to change) emerged, includ-
ing the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi, and Hanbali schools in the Sunni tradition and
the Ja’fari school in the Shia tradition.177 This pluralism is also evident in
legal adaptation to practices and customs. Islamic legal interpretations in
the Middle East differ from those in South Asia, Indonesia, or Bosnia; di-
versity is the norm.
Despite this nuance—complexity and changeability in Islamic juris-
prudence—and despite the fact that faith-based arbitration in Ontario would
only apply to a very small area of jurisprudence, the term “Shari’a Courts”
was inaccurately used to characterize what was being sought in Ontario. In
popular usage, this term raised the specter of stoning women, capital pun-
171. Kamali, supra note 7, at 216, 224.
172. Noah Feldman, Why Shariah?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 16, 2008, at 46.
173. See J. SCHACT, THE ORIGINS OF MUHAMMADAN JURISPRUDENCE (1959).
174. See 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, which published lectures from the Conference on Compara-
tive Links between Islamic Law and the Common Law.
175. Bassiouni & Badr, supra note 121.
176. See MOHAMED HASHIM KAMALI, THE PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE (1991).
177. See, e.g., FARUQI & FARUQI, supra note 105, at 264–79.
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ishment, and other such fears.178 A significant contributing factor to this
fear is the Shari’a-based laws and practices in certain Muslim countries.
Arguments for faith-based arbitration became unwinnable no matter how
nuanced or qualified once the term Shari’a was associated with the issue.
As Tariq Modood accurately noted in the British context:
Part of the problem is language. The mere fact of saying some-
thing positive about “sharia” leads to knee-jerk hostility amongst
many people, just as the term “secularism” regrettably is under-
stood by some Muslims as a policy of atheism, colonialism or
postcolonial despotism. The use of either of these terms can lead
to the closing of minds, however reasonable and qualified what is
being said.179
During one panel discussion in April 2004, for instance, all my
nuanced legal arguments were shoved aside the moment other panelists
brought up the specter of women being stoned in the streets and thieves’
hands being cut off.180 Neither matter would be subject to arbitration under
Islamic or Canadian law.181 In fact, a tribunal would have no jurisdiction to
entertain such matters. Even if such decisions were made by an arbitral
tribunal, they would be unenforceable and members of the tribunal and
those carrying out such rulings would be subject to criminal and civil sanc-
tions. These fine details fall on deaf ears when hysteria, fear, and emotions
take over.
It was also inaccurate to characterize these tribunals as full-fledged
Islamic law courts, because such a characterization would include public
law issues as well as the full spectrum of private law issues—the bulk of
which cannot be the subject of arbitration or private resolution. The tribu-
nals would have simply used Islamic legal principles to resolve a very spe-
cific and limited set of civil disputes, which may be the subject of
arbitration under the limited jurisdiction of the Arbitration Act. What would
have evolved out of the proposals by the IICJ or the institutionalization of
the application of Islamic legal principles in arbitration should be more ac-
curately characterized as a form of Muslim dispute resolution consistent
178. Sherman A. Jackson, What is Sharia and Why Does it Matter?, THE HUFFINGTON POST
(Sept. 11, 2010, 8:16 PM), http:/www.huffingtonpost.com/sherman-a.jackson/what-is-sharia-and-
why-d_b_710976.html.
179. Tariq Modood, Multicultural Citizenship and the Anti-Sharia Storm, OPENDEMOCRACY
(Feb. 14, 2008), http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/faith_ideas/europe_islam/
anti_sharia_storm.
180. Noor Cultural Center, Islamic Law and Faith-Based Arbitration: An Overview (Apr. 16,
2004). At this event, a group of secular “fundamentalists” (Muslims and non-Muslims) heckled
me and asked me to go back home if I wanted Shari’a. They only calmed down when the or-
ganizers intervened and I retorted to their heckling by suggesting that they were acting like the
“Secular Taliban.”
181. See BOYD, supra note 5, at 14; see also Zeyad Alqurashi, Arbitration Under the Islamic
Sharia, 1 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 1 (2004).
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with Canadian laws and within the flexibility of Islamic normative
practices.
The core Islamic teachings of equality, compassion, justice, freedom,
and generosity could have been be brought to the fore again by using inter-
pretations that are consistent with the spirit of Islam and present realities.182
If Islamic dispute resolution is a simple exercise of grafting the Western
paradigm onto the existing Islamic rules, then it will not be fair or just.183
Some of the classical and imported rules, practices, and customs would not
advance the cause of justice. The status quo in terms of fiqh rules and rul-
ings—characterized far too often with abuse of women and minorities—is
partly the product of rigid interpretations shaped by tribal and cultural
norms.
Yet, the purported blanket prohibition of religious arbitration under-
mines the work of Islamic feminists and other reformers who argue for the
progressive possibilities inherent in renewed interpretations of Islamic
law.184 As noted by Bakht, many feminist groups’ and activists’ blanket
opposition to Islamic law has reinforced the idea that religion is bound to
patriarchal tradition, unchangeable, and ultimately dangerous for women.
Moreover, as Bakht poignantly points out, “By setting up the secular
against the religious, Canadian feminists perpetuated the dichotomy be-
tween the modern, enlightened West and pre-modern, backward Islam.”185
This formal arbitration initiative provided an opportunity to shed some
of the cultural baggage and revisit some of the patriarchally misinterpreted
and/or context specific rulings by refocusing on the Qur’an’s emphasis on
gender equality.186 Islamic feminist Riffat Hassan, for instance, argues that
while Islamic society continues to treat women as unequal to men, the
proper reading of the Qur’an leads to a very different conclusion:
182. See Ziba Mir-Hosseini, The Construction of Gender in Islamic Legal Thought and Strate-
gies for Reform, 1 HAWWA: J. WOMEN MIDDLE E. & ISLAMIC WORLD 1 (2003).
183. “Islamic law is being exploited in many countries to oppress women and minorities,”
says Anwaar Syed of the Canadian Muslim Civil Liberties Association. “If the tribunal wishes to
institute that kind of interpretation then they will be hard pressed to find support within the com-
munity.” Faisal Kutty, Canada’s Islamic Dispute Resolution Initiative Faces Strong Opposition,
WASH. REP. ON MIDDLE E. AFF. 70–71 (May 2004). While cautious about the initiative put for-
ward by the Institute, Syed’s group is in favor of formalizing ADR within the community to
resolve disputes amicably.
184. There is a difference between Islamic feminists and Muslim feminists. Asma Barlas, The
Qur’an, Sexual Equality, and Feminism, Presentation at the University of Toronto (Jan. 12, 2004),
http://www.asmabarlas.com/TALKS/20040112_UToronto.pdf. Islamic feminists derive their con-
ceptions of gender equality from the Qur’an, while Muslim feminists “almost universally consider
Islam oppressive because they view God ‘himself’ as being misogynistic.” Id.
185. See Bakht, Muslim Barbarians, supra note 29.
186. See, e.g., ASMA BARLAS, “BELIEVING WOMEN” IN ISLAM: UNREADING PATRIARCHAL IN-
TERPRETATIONS OF THE QUR’AN (2002); Asma Barlas, Amina Wadud’s Hermeneutics of the
Qur’an: Women Rereading Sacred Texts, in CONTEMPORARY MUSLIM INTELLECTUALS AND THE
QURAN: MODERNIST AND POST MODERNIST APPROACHES (Suha Taji-Faruqi ed., 2004).
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Having spent seven years in study of the Qur’anic passages relat-
ing to women, I am convinced that the Qur’an is not biased
against women and does not discriminate against them. On the
contrary, because of its protective attitude toward all downtrod-
den and oppressed classes, it appears to be weighted in many
ways in favor of women.187
This was also an opportunity to take into consideration, inter alia, the mod-
ern context, new customs and practices, and the accumulated wisdom of
human knowledge since the days of the classical Islamic rulings.
This “indigenization” would be consistent with the long-established Is-
lamic traditions tajdid (renewal) and islah (reform), which reflect “a contin-
uing tradition of revitalization of Islamic faith and practice within the
historic communities of Muslims.”188 These concepts imply, among other
things, a return to the authentic sources of Islamic law, the Qur’an and the
Sunnah, for guidance in present practice; “the assertion of the right of inde-
pendent analysis (ijtihad) of the Qur’an and the Sunnah in this application,”
rather than reliance on and application of the opinions of past jurists (taq-
lid); and finally, a reassertion of the “authenticity and uniqueness” of the
Qur’anic message, a universal experience applicable to all times and
places.189
Through these methods, renewers (mujaddidun) and reformers (mus-
lihun) revisit the sources anew in light of present circumstances and reinter-
pret the universal and timeless Islamic ideals in light of present realities and
prevailing ideas.190 Through tajdid, scholars embark on a “renewal of the
reading, understanding, and consequently, the implementations of texts in
light of the various historicocultural contexts in which Muslim communities
or societies exist,” while islah accordingly encourages “reforming the
human, spiritual, social, or political context” in light of these readings.191
The “indigenization” would also be in tune with the tradition of ij-
tihad. As Basheer Nafi notes:
At the heart of the reformists’ call for ijtihad is their belief in the
notion of ta’lil, or the intelligibility of God’s injunction. For long
a matter of heated debate between scholars of Islamic legal theory
(usul al-fiqh), the reformists, like their salafi ancestors, believed
that the wisdom behind the devine nass/hukm (text/injunction) is
amenable to human reason, and is thus open to interpreta-
tions . . . . Equally informed by the ‘ultimate purposes of the
sharia theory, formulated by the Andalusian scholar Abu Ishaq al-
187. Riffat Hassan, On Human Rights and the Qur’anic Perspective, 19 J. ECUMENICAL STUD.
51, 63 (1992).
188. Voll, supra note 14, at 32.
189. Id. at 35.
190. RAMADAN, supra note 15, at 12–13.
191. Id. at 13.
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Shatibi (d. 790/1388), the reformist call for ijtihad became a mod-
ern-Islamic celebration of reason and rationality.192
These transformative and evolutionary concepts would be instrumental to
Islamic scholars attempting to formulate “indigenous” Islamic legal ap-
proaches to issues in the Canadian context, according to a renewed reading
of the sources in light of contemporary contexts.193 Such reform attempts
are already evident in the fatawa (legal rulings) being issued in Western
contexts.194 Illustrative of the context-specific changes are two relatively
high profile fatawa with respect to the recreation of the bust of the prophet
Mohamed in the U.S. Supreme Court and the involvement of Muslim citi-
zens in the U.S. Army. In both cases, Shaikh Taha Jabir Alwani of the Fiqh
Council of North America issued fatawa approving them given the context
and based on his reading of existing jurisprudence and analysis of the
sources.195 Adhering strictly to the classical rulings by exercising taqlid (the
Islamic equivalent of stare decisis) would not have resulted in such fatawa.
With respect to women, it has convincingly been argued that the
Qur’an and Sunnah elevated the historical status of women.196 Over time
many of the progressive gains have not kept pace and in some situations
appear to have regressed. Nevertheless, since the classical era there have
been scholars attempting to improve the lot of women. At the turn of the
twentieth century, mainstream scholars such as Muhammad Abduh and his
student Qasim Amin began to argue for the improvement of women’s rights
in Islam.197 Religious feminists and reformers have since increasingly as-
serted that traditions and legal rulings can evolve to reflect contemporary
understanding and customs.198 They have argued that the two primary
192. Basheer M. Nafi, The Rise of Islamic Reformist Thought and its Challenge to Traditional
Islam, in ISLAMIC THOUGHT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 28, 43 (Suha Taji-Farouki & Basheer M.
Nafi eds., 2004).
193. Emon, supra note 12, at 391. Emon envisages a “marketplace” of Islamic law with new
rules developing. This is not something totally new (except of course in terms of the setting being
in the Canadian context) as it is the revival of the Islamic tradition as evident from the existence of
numerous classical schools of Islamic jurisprudence.
194. There has been a proliferation of dozens, if not hundreds, of websites in Europe and
North America, which cater to Western Muslims by issuing rulings that are more relevant to the
social, political, and economic realities they find themselves in.
195. Taha Jaber al-Alwani, Fatwa Concerning the United States Supreme Court Frieze, 15
J.L. & Religion 1 (2000); Ali Farkhunda, American Muslim Military Participation in the War,
THE ISLAMIC CENTER OF GREATER TOLEDO (Oct. 11, 2001), http://www.icgt.org/SpecialArticles/
MuslimsInMilitary.htm.
196. ABD AL-HALIM MUHAMMAD ABU SHUQQAH, TAHRIR AL-MAR’AH FI ASR AL-RISALAH
(1991).
197. QASIM AMIN, THE LIBERATION OF WOMEN AND THE NEW WOMAN (Samiha Sidhom Pe-
terson trans., 1992). See BARBARA FREYER STOWASSER, WOMEN IN THE QUR’AN, TRADITIONS,
AND INTERPRETATION (1996), for a synopsis of Muhammad Abduh’s views on women.
198. See Mir-Hosseini, supra note 182, at 26; see also LEILA AHMED, WOMEN AND GENDER IN
ISLAM (1992); BARLAS, supra note 186; STOWASSER, supra note 197; AMINA WADUD, QUR’AN
AND WOMAN REREADING THE SACRED TEXT FROM A WOMAN’S PERSPECTIVE (1999); Hassan,
supra note 187.
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sources of Islam provide much support and evidence for empowering wo-
men and improving their status in society. This interpretation would entail
rethinking many of the prevailing notions and norms. Indeed, many schol-
ars, including Islamic feminists such as Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Asma Barlas,
Riffat Hassan, Amina Wadud, and Leila Ahmed, among others, have al-
ready proposed such reforms in the Islamic legal context.199
Arguably, Islamic feminists and modernist reformers may have limited
legitimacy in the eyes of many in the community. Fortunately, it is not only
Islamic feminists and reformers that are now advancing such arguments.200
More recently, mainstream popular scholars with significant followings
have started to emphasize the need to make Islam more relevant to contem-
porary times, particularly when it comes to women.201 One who has cap-
tured the attention of many Western-educated Muslims is Tariq Ramadan, a
leading European Islamic reformer.202 Ramadan is the son of Said Rama-
dan, one of the most prominent Islamist intellectuals of this century. His
grandfather, Hassan al Banna, was one of the founders of Ikhwan al Mus-
limeen (Muslim Brotherhood). This pedigree guarantees him a level of le-
gitimacy and credibility not enjoyed by many other reformers.
Ramadan proposes a model for renewal-reform that could potentially
apply to the Canadian situation.203 Ramadan conceives of a new approach,
in which the scholars of the Islamic texts (ulama an-nusus), who specialize
in the “text sciences” (Qur’anic exegeses, hadith sciences, and usul al-fiqh),
work together with “scholars of the context” (ulama al-waqi) who are
versed in the “context sciences” (the human, social, scientific, and other
sciences), in order to create informed Islamic legal rulings through collabo-
ration.204 Fatawa issued in this manner would have the benefit of the wis-
dom of textual scholars as well as relevant experts.205 While not necessarily
199. See AHMED, supra note 198; BARLAS, supra note 186; STOWASSER, supra note 197;
WADUD, supra note 199; Hassan, supra note 187; Mir-Hosseini, supra note 182, at 26.
200. See, e.g., FADL, supra note 168; HASAN AL-TURABI, WOMEN IN ISLAM AND MUSLIM SOCI-
ETY (1973) as republished at http://www.soundvision.com/Info/women/turabi.asp; Mohammad
Fadel, Two Women, One Man: Knowledge, Power and Gender in Medieval Sunni Legal Thought,
29 INT’L J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 185, 185–204 (1997) .
201. See, e.g., YUSUF AL-QARADAWY, THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN ISLAM (2002), available at
http://www.witness-pioneer.org/vil/Books/Q_WI/default.htm (challenging some of the restrictions
imposed on women). Hamza Yusuf is a prominent North American scholar with a broad following
has not written a significant dedicated work on this subject. His various speeches, short articles,
lectures and sermons advance a progressive vision when it comes to women. He founded Zaytuna
College to educate and train future religious leaders. ZAYTUNA COLLEGE, http://www.zaytunacol-
lege.org/ (last visited Dec. 7, 2010).
202. Nicholas Le Quesne, Trying to Bridge A Great Divide, TIME MAG., Dec. 11, 2000, http://
www.time.com/time/innovators/spirituality/profile_ramadan.html; Andrew March, Who’s Afraid
of Tariq Ramadan?, AM. PROSPECT, June 1, 2010, at 34, available at http://www.prospect.org/cs/
articles?article=whos_afraid_of_tariq_ramadan.
203. RAMADAN, supra note 15.
204. Id. at 129.
205. Id. at 130–31.
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a novel approach, Ramadan has reconceptualized the relationship between
these two groups from a hierarchical one, to one of equality.206 Ramadan
argues that both sets of scholars are equally important in the creation of “an
applied Islamic ethics in the various fields of knowledge” in furtherance of
his expanded list of maqasid (higher objectives).207 He writes:
If Islam is a universal Message, appropriate to all places over all
times, then this should be shown, proved and expressed through a
permanent reflection going and coming from the sources to reality
and from reality to the sources. This process should be witnessed
in every time, everywhere so that the application of the Islamic
law remains faithful to the maqasid al-shari’a.208
As Andrew March points out, Ramadan replaces the traditional
maqasid framework with a multi-tiered, multi-dimensional scheme, which
effectively expands the maqasid from five to forty-one.209 By acknowledg-
ing what is immutable and what is open to change in both the texts and the
context, scholars can embark on tajdid and islah by engaging in “critical
reading, interpretations, and strategies,” and come together to create a
“common (collaborative, specialized) ijtihad of applied ethics.”210 The re-
sult, of course, will be a new or reformed set of normative rules, practices,
and principles to guide human action and relationships.211
In the context of the Ontario faith-based arbitration debate, Ramadan’s
model would have been quite useful. He calls for a complete rethinking of
Islamic laws from within, by recasting the existing conceptual tools and
formalizing a more comprehensive dialectic between religious scholars and
scholars of context. Indeed, a collaborative effort by Islamic and Canadian
legal scholars, as well as other experts in the development of Canadian Is-
lamic jurisprudence, may have alleviated many of the fears—identifying
dangers, both real and perceived—elicited by the ambiguous concept of
“Shari’a.” Interestingly, as part of their recommendations to Marion Boyd,
the Islamic Council of Imams—Canada called for the establishment of such
an integrated board of Islamic and Canadian legal scholars for the purpose
of reviewing decisions made in the context of faith-based arbitration.212
There were few calls, however, in the way of establishing a cooperative
model through which Canadian-Islamic jurisprudence could begin develop-
ing with the input of both textual and contextual scholars.
206. Id. at 129, 134–44.
207. Id. at 130.
208. TARIQ RAMADAN, TO BE A EUROPEAN MUSLIM: A STUDY OF ISLAMIC SOURCES IN THE
EUROPEAN CONTEXT 93 (1999).
209. Andrew March, Law as a Vanishing Mediator in the Theological Ethics of Tariq Rama-
dan, EUR. J. POL. THEORY (forthcoming 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1478910.
210. RAMADAN, supra note 15, at 145.
211. Id.
212. BOYD, supra note 5, at 127.
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As the Canadian Muslim community continues to establish itself in
Canada, it is likely that an indigenized body of Islamic law will develop.213
The Canadian Muslim community as a whole is relatively young, and many
in the wider group are relative newcomers to Canada.214 There is at present,
however, a “wealth of talent, knowledge and leadership available within the
Muslim community” that must be called upon.215 A constructive and crea-
tive Canadian Muslim identity is already evolving. Encouraging this same
creative approach in the application of Islamic law in the private sphere,
while integrating both Muslim and Canadian ideals, would contribute
greatly to the development of an indigenized Islamic jurisprudence. Consis-
tent with the tradition of internal Islamic legal pluralism, this body of juris-
prudence would reflect a broad array of views and approaches in a
Canadian context. In other words, the multiplicity of interpretations and
schools of thought as they exist on the ground today would continue to
evolve, be formalized, and be tempered in accommodation.
This may sound purely theoretical. Over the past fifteen years, I have
been fortunate enough to be involved in this evolution. I have worked with
clients and their Islamic scholar of choice to craft legal solutions that are
consistent with both systems of law. In the process, existing Islamic rules
have been changed or transformed, even without the benefit of the radical
trajectory proposed by Ramadan. In the inheritance area, for instance,
scholars have rendered fatwas equalizing the shares to be given to daughters
and sons.216 The rationale provided was that the unequal distribution was
ostensibly based on a son being held responsible to care for his mom and
sisters. Such rights would be enforceable in an Islamic jurisdiction, and
since this arrangement would not be enforceable in the Canadian context,
the scholars have provided this dispensation to reflect contextual realities.
Moreover, they have pointed to the fact that the Prophet explicitly ordered
that children be treated equally in the context of favors and gifts.217 Schol-
ars highlight this to evince that the Prophet did not mandate any discrimina-
tory treatment. Such creative reforms are being repeated throughout North
America thanks in part to institutions such as the International Institute of
Islamic Thought,218 the Fiqh Council of North America, and even some
213. There is evidence it is already developing but there is no structure, organization, or for-
mality to the process.
214. See generally 2001 Canadian Census Statistics on Religion, Immigrant Status, and Pe-
riod of Immigration, STATISTICS CANADA, http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/english/census01/shared/
redirectproduct.cfm?ips=97F0022XIE2001004 (last modified Mar. 9, 2010).
215. BOYD, supra note 5, at 131.
216. Classical and even more contemporary Islamic inheritance rules insisted on a daughter
receiving half the shares of a son. Now some scholars even suggest that given the present realities,
the family should sit together and collectively decide to distribute equally.
217. Num’an b. Bashir narrated that the Prophet (peace be upon him) said, “Treat all your
children justly and equally; treat all your children justly and equally.” Abu Dawud Sulayman ibn
al-Ash’ath al-Sijisthani, Sunan Abu Dawud (1983).
218. INT’L INST. OF ISLAMIC THOUGHT, http://www.iiit.org/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2010).
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local mosques.219 The Fiqh Council, for instance, is a group of Islamic
scholars developing contemporary fiqh that is culturally, politically, and so-
cially relevant to the North American or Western contexts.220 The evolu-
tionary and context-specific nature of Islamic law is evident in many of the
rulings emanating from such institutions in the North American context.
PART 7 – MULTICULTURALISM AND LEGAL PLURALISM
The faith-based arbitration controversy in Ontario is a compelling case
study in multiculturalism and legal pluralism. Multiculturalism is essen-
tially the idea that a diversity of cultures can coexist within a single national
state.221 Legal pluralism is the notion that individuals and groups are bound
by and respect a plurality of legal orders within that state.222 A multicultural
society inherently accepts the idea that the various subgroups within society
will celebrate their differences in all areas including the legal arena. Indeed,
I believe this is the essence of multicultural citizenship and stands in stark
contrast to the cultural assimilation traditionally demanded of migrants and
minorities.
Many nations around the world have officially adopted multicultural-
ism.223 Several Western nations adopted it as official policy beginning in
the 1970s.224 Canada was part of this group.225 The main impetus was Ca-
nada’s increasing cultural diversity. Since then multicultural theorists have
struggled with attempts to accommodate and extend self-governance rights
to minority groups.
The nature and limits of accommodation within liberal democracies
have been the subject of considerable scholarship over the last few de-
cades.226 The primary focus of pioneering theorists such as Charles Taylor
and Will Kymlicka has been the legal accommodation claims of minori-
ties.227 A detailed discussion of the various models and their strengths and
weaknesses are beyond the scope of this paper, but a very brief synopsis of
219. FIQH COUNCIL OF N. AM., http://www.fiqhcouncil.org/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2010).
220. There is much work being done in this area. Tariq Ramadan, Hamza Yousuf, Muzzamil
Siddiqui, and Taha Jabir Al Alwani are some of the leading voices. See THE CORDOBA INITIATIVE,
http://www.cordobainitiative.org/?q=content/shariah-index-project (last visited Dec. 28, 2010).
221. See generally TARIQ MODOOD, MULTICULTURALISM (2007); CHARLES TAYLOR ET AL.,
MULTICULTURALISM (1994); Faisal Bhabha, Between Exclusion and Assimilation: Experimentaliz-
ing Multiculturalism, 54 MCGILL L.J. 45, 51 (2009).
222. John Griffiths, What is Legal Pluralism?, 24 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1, 38 (1986); Sally
Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 L. & SOC’Y REV. 869 (1988).
223. Bhabha, supra note 221, at 51.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. See, e.g., WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY AND CULTURE (1989); ENGAGING
CULTURAL DIFFERENCES: THE MULTICULTURAL CHALLENGE IN LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES (Richard
A. Shweder et al. eds., 2002).
227. KYMLICKA, supra note 226; TAYLOR, supra note 221.
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their main themes is required to provide context for how the debate relates
to issues of multicultural citizenship and legal pluralism.
A majority of theorists favor a multicultural citizenship regime that
respects group-based differences.228 It is argued that this “rule-and-exemp-
tion” model of multicultural citizenship is best suited to creating a more just
society by expanding the more limited, traditional understanding of citizen-
ship. The trouble with most of the models is their over emphasis or exclu-
sive reliance on liberal values. Most of the leading theorists accept the
fundamental truth of Rawls when he argues that, when given the choice, all
reasonable people will choose to be liberal or they will eventually “evolve”
to the liberal choice. In fact, Kymlicka, who is considered a leading theo-
rist, goes as far as to defend minority groups “only if, and in so far as, they
are themselves governed by liberal principles.”229 This of course goes
against the liberal democratic notion of individual freedom and the latitude
to make decisions about one’s own life. Indeed, as Jeff Spinner-Halev and
Jacob Levy argue, if liberty is to be meaningful, the liberal state must pro-
tect the freedom of religious communities to govern their lives according to
their deeply held views.230
Scholars have identified two broad themes in critiques of multicul-
turalism.231 The internal (feminist and minorities within minorities) and ex-
ternal critiques (main ones rely on alternative conceptualizations of political
membership, liberalism, civic-republicanism, and ethnoculturalism) have
become more pronounced over the years.232 The internal critiques are more
relevant to the arbitration controversy. While disputes over the scope/limits
and the critiques are not unique to gender, the most recent debates including
the faith-based arbitration debate all highlight a new brand of secular-relig-
ious quandary around women, gender, and family.
The most ardent feminist critique applicable to the situation under dis-
cussion is evident in the work of Susan Moller Okin, who answered her
own question “Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?” in the affirmative.233
Other internal critiques applicable to the faith-based arbitration revolve
around problems encountered by some minorities within minorities—for
example, women and dissenters—which Ayelet Shachar terms the “paradox
228. Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM AND THE POLITICS OF
RECOGNITION 38 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994).
229. WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY
RIGHTS 153 (1995).
230. Avigail Eisenberg & Jeff Spinner-Halev, Introduction to MINORITIES WITHIN MINORI-
TIES: EQUALITY, RIGHTS AND DIVERSITY 1, 11 (Avigail Eisenberg & Jeff Spinner-Halev eds.,
2005).
231. Ayelet Shachar, Two Critiques of Multiculturalism, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 253 (2001).
232. Shachar, supra note 5, at 86.
233. Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, in IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD
FOR WOMEN? (Joshua Cohen et al. eds., 1999).
2010] MYTH AND REALITY OF “SHARI’A COURTS” IN CANADA 597
of multicultural vulnerability.”234 The argument here is that in accommo-
dating minorities, dissenters and some women may be subject to discrimi-
nation and oppression through forced conformity to group views and
practices. In some situations, they may be excommunicated (formally or
informally) or may be forced to “voluntarily” exit the group to escape. The
paradox and questions raise legitimate concerns, but devaluing the signifi-
cance of religion and emphasizing the primacy of liberal values also results
in oppression—oppression of the more “religious” or “orthodox” sub-
groups within a minority group.
I agree that there is a “paradox of multicultural vulnerability” when it
comes to some women, dissenters, and liberals within the group, but con-
servatives or illiberal moderates within the group face what I call the “para-
dox of liberal vulnerability.” In the faith-based arbitration debate, the
minority (secular Muslims and even some non-secular Muslims who did not
want the choice) oppressed a subgroup who wanted to order their lives in
accordance with their faith. The secular or less orthodox minority could opt
out and, in fact, had the choice to not participate or accept the jurisdiction
of these tribunals.235 Religious individuals, similarly, had the right to opt in
or accede to its jurisdiction. In this case, the liberals (including some secu-
lar Muslim women) set the agenda and effectively denied arguably more
religious women and even Islamic feminists the opportunity to order their
lives in accordance with their deeply held beliefs.
Over time, scholars have begun to realize that while a state may im-
pose its own law, various other systems of laws continue to exist and com-
pete with the state law system.236 In essence, legal pluralism is the norm,
not legal centralism. As with any controversial term, definitions of legal
pluralism abound. John Griffiths, one of the key developers of the theory,
defines a situation of legal pluralism as
one in which law and legal institutions are not all subsumable
within one “system” but have their sources in the self-regulatory
activities . . . which may support, complement, ignore or frustrate
one another, so that the “law” which is actually effective on the
“ground floor” of society is the result of enormously complex and
usually in practice unpredictable patterns of competition, interac-
tion, negotiation, isolationism, and the like.237
This contrasts sharply with legal centralism, which assumes that the state is
the only source of law.238 Many involved in the Ontario arbitration debate
234. Shachar, supra note 5; see also AYELET SCHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS:
CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS 64 (2001).
235. Shachar, supra note 5, at 62.
236. See Griffiths, supra note 222, at 38–39; Merry, supra note 222, at 2; Brian Z. Tamanaha,
Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global, 30 SYDNEY L. REV. 375, 375
(2008).
237. Griffiths, supra note 222, at 39.
238. Id. at 3.
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uncritically accepted the assumption of exclusive state control over law in-
herent in legal centralism. In reality, legal pluralism is predominant in virtu-
ally all societies. The most widely used conception of plural legal systems
is Sally Falk Moore’s notion of the semi-autonomous social field.239 These
semi-autonomous social fields each have rulemaking powers and people
abide by these rules in areas ranging from classrooms to sports fields to
places of worship.240
The evolutionary nature of Islamic law and the multicultural and plu-
ralistic nature of Canadian society provided an opportunity to acknowledge
and accept this reality, and to devise a practical model of legal pluralism
that could have facilitated a harmonious relationship between Islamic law
and Ontario law (state law). Indeed, as Moore points out, the different legal
orders exist in relation to each other and, hence, affect the way that each is
able to operate.241 There were a range of possible relationships that could
have been devised between Islamic law and state law in the faith-based
arbitration controversy.242
Forsyth, for instance, details a typology of seven potential models of
“how to ‘do’ legal pluralism.” They range from informal to formal, and
include: (1) repression of non-state justice system by the state justice sys-
tem; (2) no formal recognition but tacit acceptance by the state of the non-
state justice system; (3) no formal recognition but active encouragement of
non-state justice system by the state; (4) limited formal recognition by the
state of the exercise of jurisdictions by a non-state system; (5) formal recog-
nition of exclusive jurisdiction in a defined area; (6) state recognition of the
right of non-state justice system to exercise jurisdiction and lend its coer-
cive powers; and (7) complete incorporation of the non-state justice system
by the state.243 The level of formality and self-governance will determine
what will be acceptable from each of the perspectives—society as a whole,
the state, and the respective communities whose norms and scope of self-
governance are under negotiation or discussion. Ontario policy makers had
much to play with in crafting a solution to the quandary they faced from
2003 to 2005. In fact, various stakeholders did advance different ways of
“how to ‘do’ legal pluralism,” to borrow a phrase coined by Forsyth.244 The
government seems to have opted for the second model, which effectively
preserved the status quo. This, of course, did not address any of the legiti-
mate concerns raised, nor did it respect the rights of those who wished to
239. See generally Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social
Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 719 (1973).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Forsyth, supra note 76, at 5–8.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 1.
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live their vision of the good life in accordance with their core beliefs, as
promised to them by the project of liberal democracy.
I would concur with Chandran Kukathas and Jeff Spinner-Halev that
the state, in a multicultural citizenship model, should grant greater self-
governance powers, particularly over issues central to their identity and
preservation.245 This would be consistent with the reality of legal pluralism
that is evident on the ground. The state should only intervene when it harms
its members or the outside community. Such an intervention would only be
possible and effective if there was formal institutionalization of the practice
and interaction between the state and non-state systems.
A more robust multicultural model taking cognizance of the reality of
legal pluralism would have facilitated the indigenization process of Islamic
law. Such an indigenization would have been in line with the essence of
multiculturalism and legal pluralism. Moreover, this would have been one
of the best ways to ensure that the minority community evolves itself using
its own internal mechanisms and through respectful engagement and inter-
action with the mainstream community. This would be consistent with Mi-
randa Forsyth’s notion of “planned legal pluralism,” which would “ensure
that the various legal systems in a particular jurisdiction operate in ways
that support and enrich each other, rather than undermine and compete with
each other.”246 This is not a farfetched theoretical dream, as the evolution-
ary and context-specific nature of Islamic law makes it conducive to this
dialectical model within the broader state legal system.
As scholars have documented, it is not possible to suppress these semi-
autonomous social fields entirely within a society.247 The faith-based arbi-
tration provided Ontario with a timely opportunity to develop and experi-
ment with models of legal pluralism that could have balanced the
competing rights in a manner that attempted to respect all parties and pro-
tect the vulnerable. It was also occasion to explore how Islamic law and
liberal democracy can coexist and complement each other within a liberal
multicultural framework.
CONCLUSION
The family law arbitration controversy brought to the fore a highly
charged emotional debate that has been raging silently in multicultural de-
mocracies like Canada. As demonstrated in this paper, the issues tran-
scended dispute resolution and tugged at fundamental tensions surrounding
multiculturalism and national identity, the separation of church and state,
the limits of accommodation, and legal pluralism within a liberal democ-
racy. Proponents of faith-based arbitrations argue that religious values can
245. Eisenberg & Spinner-Halev, supra note 230, at 10–11.
246. Forsyth, supra note 76, at 1.
247. See, e.g., id. at 3.
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be a major part of a person’s identity and can therefore influence one’s
attitude and approach to conflict resolution. These proponents contend that
they should be able to govern their lives according to their conscience
within the parameters of law, if the constitutional right to freedom of relig-
ion is to have any real value. As CAIR-CAN argued:
Supporting the creation of Islamic family law tribunals, along
with those of other faith groups, is a form of accommodating the
needs of religious minorities within a multicultural society. More-
over, giving members of religious minority groups the option of
resolving civil disputes according to their own religious doctrine
within a framework that is respectful of both Canadian law and
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms is consistent with the Char-
ter’s own guarantee of freedom of religion contained in section
2(a).248
Consenting and informed adults must be able to make religious
choices even if others do not believe these are “correct” choices. As Ronald
Dworkin says about faith (albeit not in the context of this controversy):
We can’t ask people to set aside their most profound convictions
about the truth of deep moral and ethical issues when we are also
asking them to make decisions . . . that are for most people the
most basic and fundamental moral and ethical decisions they will
in their lifetime be called upon to make.249
In this paper I have demonstrated that Islamic legal doctrine is replete
with creative methodologies of reinterpretation that can serve as rich
sources for more gender-friendly practices. This interpretation lends support
to the idea that a tolerable liberalism or a quasi-sovereignty route may be
better models if we are to foster respectful coexistence.250 I have also ar-
gued that the inherent dynamism of Islamic jurisprudence, combined with
planned legal pluralism and a more inclusive notion of multicultural citizen-
ship, is the best way to balance some of the fundamental tensions. The clear
advantages of such an approach are: more constructive forms of engage-
ment between majority and minority cultures; avoiding the double standards
highlighted in the faith-based controversy by giving deliberative priority to
accommodation; and contributing to peace and coexistence by making
space rather than suppressing people’s core beliefs and values. Indeed, as
Lucas Swaine argues, the belief among religious minorities that the liberal
248. CANADIAN COUNCIL ON AMERICAN-ISLAMIC RELATIONS, REVIEW OF ONTARIO’S ARBI-
TRATION PROCESS AND ARBITRATION ACT (Aug. 10, 2004), available at http://www.caircan.ca/
downloads/sst-10082004.pdf.
249. Elizabeth Katz, Dworkin Explores Secular, Religious Models for Society, UNIV. VA. SCH.
L. (Apr. 19, 2006), http://www.law.virginia.edu/html/news/2006_spr/dworkin.htm.
250. See, e.g., Lucas Swaine, THE LIBERAL CONSCIENCE: POLITICS AND PRINCIPLE IN A
WORLD OF RELIGIOUS PLURALISM (2006); Melissa S. Williams, Tolerable Liberalism, in MINORI-
TIES WITHIN MINORITIES, supra note 230, at 19–40.
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state aims to undermine them leads to unnecessary distrust and potentially
even clashes.251
The prevailing approach of imposing secular values in the name of
human rights simply fails to understand and appreciate the fundamental role
accorded to religious beliefs and the practices of many. I would concur with
Charles Taylor and other Communitarians that social and communal ar-
rangements and institutions are crucial to the development of self-meaning
and identity.252 In fact, those who were in favor of making this option avail-
able counter that if people of faith, Muslims included, are not allowed to
exercise their religious rights within the confines of Canadian law and are
not treated or seen to be treated the same as others, distrust, alienation, and
marginalization felt by some in the community will continue to grow.
At the same time, the legitimate concerns raised by secular feminist
groups and, contrary to perception, supported by mainstream Muslim
groups, should not be trivialized or minimized. There is some basis to the
fear that women may feel pressured into submitting their disputes to an
Islamic arbitration tribunal that may be less protective of their rights.253
This understanding, however, ignores the fact that social pressure is a real-
ity in both religious and secular contexts. Moreover, this belief and its pa-
ternalistic imposition on Muslim women fails to validate or recognize that
for some women the desire to decide their dispute in accordance to their
core values and principles may take precedence over any secular under-
standing of the right choice. As Homa Fahmy of the Federation of Muslim
Women noted, “The fact that I’ve been [characterized as being] unable to
make a sound judgment in this matter, I find deeply offensive.”254
Secular feminists were misguided when they unequivocally accepted
the assumption that women, in particular Muslim women in the context of
religious arbitration, could only be saved by secularism. As noted in the
foregoing discussion about Islamic law, it is not necessarily the case that
religion must restrict women’s rights. Indeed, this undermines the work of
religious women who have sought to push the boundaries and explore the
progressive possibilities of Islamic law.
Given an ostensible commitment to equality and religious freedom in
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,255 it is hypocritical to advo-
cate secular ways as the only means of protecting the vulnerable. In the case
under discussion, the hypocrisy was glaring given that the legal system it-
self allows and encourages private dispute resolution and allows for the
251. Swaine, supra note 250.
252. Shachar, supra note 5, at 55.
253. Though a party must voluntarily consent to arbitration, feminists question whether “real”
choice is ever possible. Id. at 62–63.
254. Melissa Leong, Muslim Groups Promise Liberals a Fight on Sharia, NAT’L POST, Sept.
15, 2005, at A12.
255. Bhabha, supra note 221, at 49.
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opting out of the statutory family law regime without any active court over-
sight or sanction.
I concur with many observers who have concluded that the real losers
in the Ontario decision are women,256 especially those women who wish to
live a faith-based life, as they interpret it.257 A paternalistic attitude toward
Muslims did not and will not solve the issue of social pressure; in fact, it
will alienate many. As Boyd points out, denying Muslims the option of
using religious-based ADR not only limits their options, but it also
“push[es] the practice of religious arbitrations outside the legal system alto-
gether, thus limiting the court’s ability to intervene to correct problems.”258
ADR already exists within the Muslim community, as it does in the broader
community. People are abiding by decisions as if they were the word of
God and therefore binding.259 Formalizing the process would have opened
the door toward greater transparency and accountability. As long as there
are proper procedures and rules of conduct in place, there is nothing
preventing the community from instituting a dynamic and less disruptive
alternative to the adversarial court system. Indeed, this could have created a
safe space between the patriarchy and oppression based on certain interpre-
tations of religious laws and the paternalism and racism from the broader
mainstream community.
As the Globe and Mail editorialized at the time, “the Islamic tribunal
may yet send a message that Muslims can be who they are and still be as
Canadian as anyone else.”260 Indeed, a sober ex post facto rational review
of the issue will reveal that exploring ways to accommodate Islamic laws
within a more inclusive model of legal pluralism would provide a great
opportunity to contribute to the evolution of Islamic law by pushing its
progressive possibilities, indigenize Islam in Canada, and thereby help in
the integration of Muslims.
256. The alleged troubles encountered by Muslim women continue given that private dispute
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